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RECONSIDERING REALIZATION-BASED ACCOUNTING FOR EQUITY COMPENSATION 
 





The U.S. equity compensation landscape continues to evolve.  Recent 
innovations have improved the linkage between pay and firm-specific 
performance, but have added complexity.  Against that backdrop, this Article 
urges reconsideration of the accounting rules for equity pay.  Under current 
rules, most equity pay awards are expensed based on grant date valuation with 
no updating for changes in value post grant.  This Article advocates the 
adoption of a mark-to-market or realization-based approach under which the 
expense recorded for all equity pay awards would ultimately be trued to the 
value received by employees.  Increasingly, equity pay awards are more 
analogous to commissions than to arm’s length investments, and the tighter 
link between pay and firm-specific performance suggests that including post-
grant changes in equity pay award values in compensation expense tends to 
improve accuracy, not just add noise. In addition, increased complexity leads to 
greater ex ante valuation uncertainty and gaming opportunities, suggesting 
de-emphasizing reliance on ex ante measurement to the extent possible.  
Realization-based accounting also produces book/tax conformity for equity 
pay, which further combats gaming, and it levels the accounting playing field 
for equity instruments, minimizing accounting-induced distortions in pay 
design.  The Article also argues that concerns that realization-based 
accounting will introduce an unacceptable level of uncertainty or volatility into 
compensation expense can be mitigated. 
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Equity compensation accounting issues have vexed the profession since stock 
options emerged as a significant compensation tool in the 1970s and 1980s.  
Compensatory stock options dominated equity pay, and particularly executive 
equity pay packages, in the late 1990s and early 2000s.1  One reason for their 
popularity may have been that, prior to 2004, options were free goods from an 
accounting perspective.  Firms were not required to record an expense for option 
compensation at any time.2   
 
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) had long recognized that 
this treatment was inappropriate.  The FASB issued an invitation to comment on 
stock option accounting in 1984,3 and issued an exposure draft in 1993 proposing 
that options be expensed.4  Expensing was fiercely resisted by industry,5 and 
Senator Lieberman introduced legislation to block FASB from requiring option 
expensing.6  The FASB backed off, requiring in 1995 only that option expense be 
footnoted in financial statements, not recorded as an adjustment in calculating net 
income.7  Finally, in 2004, after options-related scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco 
                                                        
1 Kevin J. Murphy, Executive Compensation: Where We Are, and How We Got There, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 226 (George M. Constantinides et al. eds., 2013); 
David I. Walker, Evolving Equity Compensation and the Limits of Optimal Contracting, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 611, 633 (2011). 
2 See ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES BD., OPINION NO. 25, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK ISSUED TO EMPLOYEES 
(1972) [hereinafter APB 25].  Under APB 25, only the intrinsic value of an option at the date 
of grant – the degree to which an option was in the money at grant – was recognized as an 
expense.  Almost all options were granted “at the money” with zero intrinsic value at grant, 
and as a result these options resulted in no expense.  See also, Murphy, supra note 1, at 281 
(“The accounting treatment of options promulgated the mistaken belief that options could 
be granted without any cost to the company. . . . Nonetheless, the idea that options were free 
(or at least cheap) was erroneously accepted in too many boardrooms”). 
3 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., INVITATION TO COMMENT, ACCOUNTING FOR COMPENSATION 
PLANS INVOLVING CERTAIN RIGHTS GRANTED TO EMPLOYEES (May 1984). 
4  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., EXPOSURE DRAFT, ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED 
COMPENSATION (June 1993). 
5 Reportedly the FASB received over 1700 comment letters on the exposure draft, mostly 
opposing stock option expensing.  RICHARD G. SCHROEDER, ET AL., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING 
THEORY AND ANALYSIS 532 (11th ed. 2014). 
6 SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 532.  To be fair, Senator Levin had proposed legislation in 
January 1993 to compel the SEC to require companies to expense options issued to senior 
executives.  Corporate Executives’ Stock Option Accountability Act, S. 25, 103rd Congr. 
(1993).  Obviously, this was a highly politicized debate. 
7  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123, 
ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION (Oct. 1995) [hereinafter SFAS NO. 123]. 
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and elsewhere, the FASB had the political capital to mandate stock option expensing, 
and it did so.8 
 
There was little consensus among those supporting stock option expensing 
as to exactly how firms should account for the cost of employee services paid for 
with non-transferable options.  Some commentators advocated grant date 
measurement of option value utilizing a model.9  Grant date measurement had the 
advantages of determining compensation expense, once and for all, at grant, and of 
separating compensation cost from investment returns on options post grant.10  But 
there were concerns about applying models designed for market traded options to 
non-transferable employee options, 11  and other commentators argued for 
measurement of compensation cost at the point at which options were exercised or 
expired unexercised, at which time the ultimate cost to shareholders would be 
certain.12  
 
In 2004, the FASB adopted grant-date measurement of option value.13  
Perhaps a majority of the FASB believed this to be the most appropriate approach.14  
Perhaps this was all they thought they could get.15  In any event, the 2004 option 
expensing requirement was a major step in the right direction.  At the time, 
expensing options based on grant date valuation largely leveled the playing field 
between the two most significant forms of equity pay – options and restricted stock 
– as restricted stock had long been expensed based on grant date value.16 
 
Fast forward to 2016.  Equity pay flourishes, particularly in executive suites, 
but the landscape has shifted.  Stock options are passé.17  The gap created by the 
declining use of options has been largely filled with performance-based restricted 
stock, aka performance shares. 18   Performance share plans are highly 
heterogeneous and often quite complex.19  Moreover, some performance shares are 
                                                        
8 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 123 
(revised 2004) [hereinafter SFAS 123R]. 
9 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B46-48, B60. 
10 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B47. 
11 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B59. 
12 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B45.  These were not the only possibilities.  Some 
respondents, for example, suggested that measurement occur at option vesting.  Id. at B35-
36. 
13 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B46-48. 
14 The FASB said as much in SFAS 123R.  See SFAS 123R at B46-48. 
15 The FASB noted that an “overwhelming majority” of those providing comments who 
addressed the issue supported grant date measurement.  SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B48. 
16 APB 25, supra note 2. 
17 As noted infra note 39 and 48, in S&P 500 company executive suites, options accounted 
for 60% of the aggregate ex ante value of total pay at their peak and now contribute only 16 
to 17%. 
18 Infra text accompanying note 63. 
19 Infra text accompanying note 64. 
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accounted for like options; others are subject to a very different accounting 
regime.20  The level playing field lasted less than a decade.  Once again, accounting 
rules are likely to be influencing compensation plan design.  
 
Given the substantial shift in the equity pay landscape, this article argues that 
it is time to reopen the question and reconsider the accounting treatment for equity 
pay – specifically whether FASB’s apparent preference for grant date measurement 
remains appropriate (if it ever was), or whether we should shift to a realization-
based or “mark-to-market” approach. 
 
This article will consider equity pay accounting primarily from a functional 
perspective, considering the needs of investors and the impact of accounting on 
corporate governance.21  From an investor’s perspective, the optimal accounting 
regime would produce accurate and robust (i.e., not subject to manipulation) 
information on the cost of employee services and would facilitate comparison of 
employee costs from firm to firm and over time.  Because accounting rules 
determine the senior executive pay information that public companies are required 
to disclose annually in their proxy statements under SEC regulations,22 accuracy and 
comparability are also governance concerns.  Another concern from a governance 
perspective is that accounting for equity pay be neutral so as to avoid influencing 
corporate pay practices.    
 
While certainly not free from doubt, this article will argue that the case for 
realization-based or mark-to-market accounting is stronger today than it has ever 
been before.  There are three primary reasons for this.   
 
First, under mark-to-market accounting, the ultimate compensation cost 
associated with equity-based pay is set equal to the realized gains enjoyed by the 
employees.23  If one believes that share price movements between grant and 
realization are exogenous, including those movements in compensation cost 
introduces noise that undermines the usefulness of accounting information.  But if 
one views those movements as endogenous, including those movements improves 
the accuracy of the accounting information.  When time-vested restricted stock and 
stock options dominated long-term compensation packages, one could certainly 
argue that stock price movements post-grant were largely beyond the employees’ 
control.  In a rising market, all stocks and options tended to rise; and in a bear 
market, all stocks and options tended to fall.  But the connection between firm-
specific performance and equity compensation payouts is tightening.  Many 
performance share grants, for example, produce payoffs that are based on a firm’s 
                                                        
20 Infra text accompanying notes 65-68. 
21 Put another way, I am not convinced that the classification of a stock-based pay award as 
representing the issuance of equity versus the creation of a liability should drive the 
accounting treatment.  See infra Part III(B)(1). 
22 Infra note 29. 
23 Infra Part II(B). 
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performance relative to the market or a particular peer group.  Particularly when 
we consider compensation cost firm wide, there is a strong argument that realized 
gains on equity pay instruments represent a better measure of the cost of employee 
services than does a grant date measure of equity value, which assumes these gains 
are exogenous. 
 
Second, grant date valuation of complex equity-pay instruments such as 
stock options and performance-based restricted stock requires the use of 
mathematical models.24  Company managers have discretion over the assumptions 
that are fed into these models and generate grant date “fair values.”  There is 
evidence that firms have selected assumptions to reduce the grant date value of 
options.25  Recently adopted equity pay instruments are even more complex than 
conventional options and the opportunities for manipulation of grant date value are 
likely to be greater than before.  While manipulation can be reduced through 
regulation, one advantage of realization-based accounting is that the ultimate cost 
recognized is not based on a model.  It is based on realized results.  Thus, even if one 
views mark-to-market accounting as introducing noise into compensation cost 
measurement, there is a trade-off between manipulability and noise. 
 
Third, the use of different accounting treatments for different equity pay 
instruments often results in accounting-driven equity pay design choices.26  The 
poster child for this effect was, of course, the pre-2004 accounting preference for 
stock options.  While we have no such glaring inconsistency today, there are 
inconsistencies and undoubtedly accounting driven design choices.  Given current 
limitations on modeling, we cannot value all equity pay instruments at grant.  We 
also cannot apply what I will define and call partial mark-to-market accounting to all 
existing equity pay instruments.  We can apply full realization-based or mark-to-
market accounting to all instruments.  While doing so will not completely level the 
accounting playing field for these instruments, it will come closer to doing so than 
any of the alternatives. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Part I sets the stage for 
the analysis that follows by describing the overall objective of the exercise, the uses 
of accounting information, and why accuracy and consistency matter.  Part II 
describes the principal equity pay vehicles and the accounting rules applicable to 
them.  While it’s possible that completely new approaches could be developed, the 
existing approaches provide a healthy menu of alternatives for evaluation and 
analysis.  Part III, the heart of the Article, provides that evaluation and analysis, 
outlining the various factors that one would consider in designing an optimal 
accounting scheme for equity pay and applying these to our real world pay 
instruments.  The primary takeaway of Part III is that the case for realization-based 
accounting is strong.  Given that, Part III goes on to consider various objections that 
                                                        
24 Infra Part III(A). 
25 Infra text accompanying note 162.  
26 Infra Part III. 
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could (and would) be made to mark-to-market accounting for all equity pay.  After a 
brief discussion of equity pay hedging in Part IV, Part V concludes. 
 
I.  Setting the Stage 
 
 
 Before jumping into discussion of various equity pay instruments and 
accounting rules, we should begin with the big picture.  What are we trying to 
accomplish with accounting for equity pay?  What do we do with the information 
and why does it matter how we account for this compensation? 
 
 It is important to keep in mind that the overall goal is to recognize the cost of 
employee services that are performed in exchange for share-based compensation.27  
Sometimes this cost may be capitalized, as when, for example, employee services are 
dedicated to the production of self-constructed fixed assets.28  Generally, however, 
the compensation cost will be immediately deducted, or “expensed,” in determining 
corporate earnings.  The primary use of compensation cost accounting is in 
determining earnings.   
 
Accounting information is also used for proxy statement disclosure of the 
compensation of the “top five” executives of U.S. public companies.29  Although this 
use is undoubtedly secondary from an accountant’s point of view, it is highly 
important from a corporate governance perspective.  If one believes that either 
market forces or public shaming limit executive pay,30 these disclosures are critical 
for either mechanism to have an effect. 
                                                        
27  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-10-1 
[hereinafter ASC 718-10-10-1].  It is a subtle distinction, but we are not recognizing the cost 
of the equity compensation delivered to employees, but the cost of their services paid for 
with equity instruments. 
28  PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, GUIDE TO ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK-BASED COMPENSATION: A 
MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH [hereinafter PWC] 1-84. 
29 Disclosure is required for the “named executive officers,” a group which currently 
includes a company’s CEO, CFO, and three most highly compensated executives other than 
these two individuals.  17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3) (2015).  Although the SEC’s disclosure 
rules incorporate ASC 718 valuation methodology, several different disclosures are 
required, including a summary compensation table that details and aggregates the grant 
date value of executive pay provided in each year.  See 17 C.F.R. § 229.402(a)(3) (2015) 
passim.  Disclosure of grant date valuation is considered important as it provides 
information on the expected compensation agreed to by a board and facilitates cross-
company comparisons of executive pay.  See Brian Cadman et al., Shareholders’ Use of Proxy 
Statement Disclosures to Evaluate Executive Pay 2-3 (Working Paper, Oct. 2015). 
30 These are shorthand designations for the optimal contracting and managerial power 
views of the executive compensation setting process, respectively.  For an overview of the 
theory and evidence regarding corporate governance and public company executive pay see 
David I. Walker, The Law and Economics of Executive Compensation: Theory and Evidence, in 
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 Given these goals and uses, it is obvious that accounting rules should be 
designed to provide an accurate and consistent picture of compensation cost 
associated with equity pay from firm to firm and over time for particular firms.  
“Noisy” or inaccurate information on equity pay contributes to noisy or inaccurate 
earnings (assuming equity compensation represents a significant cost firm-wide) 
and undermines the disciplinary force of executive pay disclosures.  Inconsistency in 
the accounting treatment of various equity pay instruments may lead to accounting-
driven design choices.   
 
 Now at this point some readers may ask why accounting rules that have no 
impact on cash flows, such as a requirement to expense stock options, would create 
a distortion in firm behavior.  Wouldn’t market analysts see through management 
attempts to reduce reported compensation cost and increase earnings by loading up 
on option pay, in which case management would forego such futile efforts?   
 
The extent to which accounting treatments have real economic consequences 
is unclear, but there are several reasons to think that accounting matters, even when 
differences in accounting treatments are seemingly cosmetic. 31   First, as a 
theoretical matter, the positive accounting literature explains that in some cases 
reported earnings matter independently of cash flows because of various 
contractual provisions, such as debt covenants, that are tied to earnings.  In a world 
of positive transactions costs, even cosmetic changes in earnings can impact 
shareholder value.32 
 
 Second, empirical evidence – both event study and survey evidence – 
establishes that accounting standards and practices matter.33  Accounting choices 
vary systematically between firms; firms respond to changes in accounting rules, 
and firms sacrifice cash flows to boost reported earnings.  Whether rational or not, 
managers act as if accounting rules matter, so they do matter. 
 
 Third, it seems particularly difficult to maintain an “accounting irrelevance” 
position in the realm of equity pay.  Professor Kevin Murphy has argued that the 
favorable accounting treatment of compensatory stock options contributed to the 
their over-use in the late 1990s and early 2000s.34  Although other factors likely 
                                                                                                                                                                     
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 232 (Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell 
eds. 2012). 
31 This point is well established in the accounting literature, but is sometimes resisted by 
non-accountants who subscribe to a relatively strong view of efficient markets.   
32 See generally ROSS L. WATTS & JEROLD L. ZIMMERMAN, POSITIVE ACCOUNTING THEORY (1986); 
Ross L. Watts & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Positive Accounting Theory: A Ten Year Perspective, 65 
ACCT. REV. 131 (1990); see also David I. Walker, Financial Accounting and Corporate 
Behavior, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 927, 935-49 (2007). 
33 See Walker, supra note 32, at 949-965 for an overview of this evidence. 
34 Murphy, supra note 1, at 279-82. 
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played a role,35 the steep drop off in option use following FASB’s decision in 2004 to 
require firms to expense the grant date fair value of options supports Murphy’s 
argument.  Moreover, as recounted in the introduction, firms fiercely resisted stock 
option expensing.  Clearly, the managers of these firms believed expensing was an 
important issue.36   
 
 This article will assume that the accounting treatment of equity pay has real-
world consequences.  It will assume that significant disparities in treatments can 
produce distortions in pay packages; that earnings matter independent of cash 
flows; and that the efficacy of executive pay disclosures depends on the quality of 
the information disclosed, but that disclosure of accounting information in footnotes 
to financial statements is not a perfect substitute for incorporating that information 
in reported earnings.37 
 
 Equity pay raises two principal accounting issues: measurement or valuation 
and the timing of cost recognition.  This article focuses primarily on the valuation or 
measurement issues.  As we will see, recognition timing is largely determined by the 
choice of measurement technique, but is relatively consistent in any event.38  
Moreover, from a corporate governance perspective, the timing of compensation 
cost recognition is less important than the determination of the amount of pay. 
 
II. Equity Pay Vehicles and Accounting Treatments 
 
 
                                                        
35 Tax rules certainly played a role, as well.  I.R.C. § 162(m) enacted in 1993 limited 
corporate deductions for senior executive compensation to $1 million per executive per 
year, but provided an exception for certain performance-based compensation.  
Conventional at-the-money stock options easily satisfied the exception.  Thus, firms could 
provide senior executives with an unlimited amount of fully deductible compensation in the 
form of options.  Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, The Taxation of Executive Compensation, 
in 14 TAX POL’Y & ECON., 1-2 (James M. Poterba ed., NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH 2000); 
Murphy, supra note 1, at 278; Gregg D. Polsky, Controlling Executive Compensation through 
the Tax Code, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 877, 917-20 (documenting the widespread belief 
among informed observers that § 162(m) contributed to the options explosion, but also 
noting the lack of clear cut empirical evidence).   
Murphy, supra note 1 (2013), at 275-288, discusses several other factors that may have 
contributed to the stock option explosion: investor pressure for equity pay, a change in SEC 
rules regarding SEA section 16 holding periods, disclosure rules, and stock exchange listing 
requirements. 
36 Supra text accompanying note 5. 
37 The stock option expensing saga strongly suggests that including information in footnotes 
to financial statements is not equivalent to recognition of an item as an expense on the 
income statement.  Note that the fight in the late 1990s and early 2000s was solely over 
elevating stock option expense from footnote to earnings statement adjustment. 
38 Infra Part III.B.6. 
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 The equity-pay landscape and corresponding accounting rules have evolved 
considerably over the last fifteen years.  This Part briefly describes those pay 
practices and the accounting treatments, providing a context for the analysis that 
follows.  This Part focuses on public companies, which are required to provide 
audited financial statements prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP), and chiefly on large public companies that make up 
the bulk of the U.S. stock market capitalization. 
 
A. Stock Options 
 
At the height of the stock option boom in 2000, options accounted for over 
60% of the aggregate compensation (measured by ex ante value) of the senior 
executives of S&P 500 companies.39  Many of these firms issued stock options to 
upper-, mid-, and lower-level managers and some to rank and file workers.40  
Options were also ubiquitous at start up companies and remain so today.41 
 
As recounted in the Introduction, prior to 2004, firms could avoid recording 
any expense for options issued at the money, but in that year the FASB promulgated 
rules requiring companies issuing options as compensation to determine a grant 
date “fair value” for these awards, and to recognize that expense ratably over the 
vesting period of the options.42  Compensatory options typically vest, or become 
exercisable, in tranches starting a year or so after grant and ending three or four 
years after grant.43   
 
                                                        
39 Walker, supra note 1, at 633. 
40 Paul Oyer & Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give Stock Options to All Employees?: An 
Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 99, 100 (2005). See also Brian 
J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, The Trouble with Stock Options, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 49, 51 (2003). 
41 Denise A. Jones & Kimberly J. Smith, Employee Stock Options: A Standard Setting Saga, 8 J. 
BUS. CASE STUD. 241, 242 (2012); Leaders: The Trouble with Stock Options, THE ECONOMIST, 
Aug. 7, 1999, at 13-14 (noting that options have “reduced the cash costs of starting a 
company: employees can be brought on board with the mere promise of future growth that 
a share option presents”).  See also Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-
Ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1750 (1994); David I. Walker, The Way We Pay Now: 
Understanding and Evaluating Performance-Based Executive Pay 1 n. 5 (Boston Univ. School 
of Law, Law & Economics Working Paper No. 15-34, Oct. 2015). 
42 See SFAS 123R, supra note 8. 
43 FREDERIC W. COOK & CO., INC., THE 2014 TOP 250 REPORT: LONG-TERM INCENTIVE GRANT 
PRACTICES FOR EXECUTIVES 11 (Oct. 2014) [hereinafter Cook (2014)] (reporting that 90% of 
options granted by sample companies vested within three or four years of grant and that 
81% of option grants vested in installments).  Cook’s sample includes the 250 largest 
companies in the S&P 500 index. 
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The grant date fair value of options is determined by using a model.44  The 
Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) model is most familiar.45  In order to determine option 
value using BSM, one must input the current market price of the stock, the option 
exercise price (typically the market price at the time of grant), the stock’s expected 
volatility, a risk-free interest rate, expected dividend yield, and expected time to 
exercise.46  Once an initial value is calculated, that value is used to determine the 
compensation expense throughout the option’s life.  It is not updated for subsequent 
stock price movements.47 
 
Option use by large public companies has declined precipitously in recent 
years.  In 2013, options accounted for only about 16-17% of aggregate senior 
executive pay at S&P 500 companies.48 
 
B. Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) 
 
 SARs are essentially phantom stock options.  Instead of having a right to 
purchase stock in the future at a predetermined exercise price, an employee holding 
an SAR has a right to be paid in cash (or stock) the difference between the market 
price of the stock at some future point and a pre-set price, analogous to the exercise 
price of an option.49  Economically, SARs and options are identical, but their 
                                                        
44 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-55-11.  The 
discussion that follows pertains to time-vested options that do not include performance 
conditions.  Performance-vested options are rarely observed.  See J. Carr Bettis, John Bizjak, 
Jeffrey Coles & Swaminathan Kalpathy, Performance-Vesting Provisions in Executive 
Compensation 55 (Table 2, Panel A) (Working Paper, Mar. 25, 2016) [hereinafter BBCK 
(2016)] (reporting that only one firm in their sample of over 1000 companies issued 
performance-contingent options in 2012).  A performance-contingent option would be 
accounted for in a fashion similar to that of performance shares.  See infra Part II.D. 
45 See JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES  299-44 (8th ed. 2012).  
Sometimes the model is simply referred to as the Black-Scholes model.  Id. at 299. 
46 HULL, supra note 45, at 214. 
47 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-30; PWC, 
supra note 28, at 1-13.  The grant date fair value of the award is expensed ratably over the 
option vesting period.  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 
718-10-35-2 [hereinafter ASC 718-10-35-2].  See also, PWC, supra note 28, at 1-24.  
Although option value is not re-measured to reflect market movements, the aggregate 
expense associated with options grants is adjusted to reflect likely forfeitures. ASC 718-10-
30-11. 
48 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL/HAY GROUP, 2014 CEO COMPENSATION STUDY 5 (2015) (reporting 
that options accounted for 16% of aggregate CEO pay at a sample of large firms in 2014).  
Execucomp data suggests that options accounted for about 17% of senior executive pay at 
S&P 500 firms in 2013.  Author’s calculations. 
49 SARs may be stock settled or cash settled or may provide for settlement in stock or cash 
at the election of the company or the employee.  Judith E. Alden & Murray S. Akresh, Using 
Equity to Compensate Executives, in EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 67, 98 (Yale D. Tauber & 
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accounting treatment is very different.  Cash-settled SARs are considered liabilities 
rather than equity instruments, and they are accounted for on a mark-to-market 
basis.50  A model is used to determine the value of a cash-settled SAR, and that value 
is reassessed periodically.51  Ultimately, the compensation cost recognized with 
respect to a cash-settled SAR is set equal to the employee’s realized gain on 
exercise.52  As a result, the recognition period for SAR compensation can extend 
beyond vesting to exercise.53  SARs are relatively unpopular, constituting a small 
fraction of the “options” issued by U.S. companies.54 
 
C. Time-Vested Restricted Stock/RSUs 
 
 As the term suggests, restricted stock is stock that is issued to an employee, 
but is restricted with respect to sale or hypothecation.  In the late 1990s, time-
vested restricted stock accounted for about 10% of the aggregate compensation of 
S&P 500 senior executives. 55 Typically, this stock vests, or becomes owned outright 
by the recipient, all at once or in tranches, between a year and four years after 
                                                                                                                                                                     
Donald R. Levy eds., 2002).  Accounting for stock-settled SARs is identical to option 
accounting.  PWC, supra note 28, at 1-52.  The focus here is on cash-settled SARs and all 
references to SARs will assume that they are of the cash-settled variety. 
50 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-30-35; PWC, 
supra note 28, at 1-13.  The FASB does not use the term “mark to market.”  ASC 718-30-35 
specifies that the fair value of liabilities associated with equity pay is to be re-measured 
periodically through settlement.  I believe “mark to market” captures the flavor of this 
approach, although more technically, the approach here might be termed “mark to model” 
since there is no market in SARs to observe.  The “market” prices being observed – share 
price, interest rates, volatility, etc. – are inputs for a model that is used to re-measure fair 
value from time to time.  Despite these technicalities, I will generally refer to this method as 
“mark to market.” 
51  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-30-35-2 
[hereinafter ASC 718-30-35-2]; PWC, supra note 28, at 1-44. 
52 ASC 718-30-35-2, supra note 44; PWC, supra note 28, at 1-44. 
53 PWC, supra note 28, at 1-45. 
54 Execucomp data does not distinguish between conventional options and SARs, leaving 
only survey data to fill the gap.  In a recent study, Hay Group noted that 6% of 290 sample 
firms reported making SAR grants to executives in 2012, although that figure could include 
both stock settled SARs, accounted for like conventional options, as well as cash-settled 
SARs.  HAY GROUP, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 2013: DATA, TRENDS AND STRATEGIES 20 (2014).  
Less than 5% (11 firms) of 250 companies participating in a Frederick W. Cook executive 
pay survey reported using SARs in their compensation programs in 2013.  FREDERIC W. COOK 
& CO., INC., THE 2013 TOP 250 REPORT 12-20 (2013). 
55 Walker, supra note 1, at 633. 
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grant.56  As with options, restricted stock is often issued to mid-level managers as 
well as to senior executives.   
 
 A popular variation is called a restricted stock unit (RSU).  While restricted 
stock is actually issued at grant and returned if it fails to vest, an RSU is a promise to 
deliver stock in the future if vesting conditions are satisfied.57  Economically, the 
two instruments are virtually identical.58 
 
 For accounting purposes, time-vested restricted stock awards and RSUs are 
valued at grant at the market price of the stock at grant, despite the possibility that 
some shares will be forfeited if employees leave their firm’s employment prior to 
vesting.59  However, the total expense associated with restricted stock and RSUs at a 
particular firm is reduced by the number of shares that the firm expects to be 
forfeited, and that retention adjustment is updated from time to time.60  As with 
options, RS/RSU expense is recognized ratably over the vesting period.61 
 
 Time-vested RS and RSUs accounted for about 16% of aggregate senior 
executive pay at S&P 500 firms in 2013.62  In other words, use of conventional 
options and time-vested RS/RSUs at these firms is currently about balanced. 
 
D. Performance-Based Restricted Stock/RSUs  
 
 As compensatory option use has declined, the void has largely been filled by 
performance-based restricted stock, which in recent years has accounted for about 
30% of the aggregate compensation of CEOs at S&P 500 companies.63  Unlike grants 
of stock options and time-vested restricted stock, which are strikingly uniform in 
design, performance-based restricted stock and stock units are quite 
                                                        
56 Cook (2014), supra note 43, at 10-11 (reporting that 91% of restricted stock granted by 
sample companies vested within three or four years of grant and that 54% of stock grants 
vested in installments).   
57 HAY GROUP, THE EXECUTIVE EDITION (Sept. 2013) (reporting that over time RSUs have 
largely displaced conventional time-vested restricted stock). 
58 There can be differences in dividend and voting rights, but the incentives created by RS 
and RSUs are identical.  HAY GROUP, supra note 57. 
59 PWC, supra note 28, at 1-13.  If employees are not entitled to dividends on RS/RSUs 
during the vesting period, the grant date value is reduced by the expected dividends, 
discounted to present value.  Id. 
60 PWC, supra note 28, at 1-13. 
61  ASC 718-10-35-2, supra note 47.  See also PWC, supra note 28, at 1-24 
62 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL/HAY GROUP, supra note 48, at 5 (2015) (reporting that restricted 
stock accounted for 16% of aggregate CEO pay at a sample of large firms in 2014).   
63 THE WALL STREET JOURNAL/HAY GROUP, supra note 48, at 5 (reporting that performance 
awards accounted for 32% of aggregate CEO pay at a sample of large firms in 2014, 
although that figure could include some cash-settled performance awards). 
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heterogeneous.64  The most common variant, called performance shares, are grants 
of stock (or stock units) that vest only if both time and other performance 
conditions are satisfied.65  These plans typically include a variable number of shares 
that may vest based on satisfaction of increasingly ambitious performance targets 
measured over a pre-set period, most commonly three years.66  Targets may include 
accounting measures of performance, such as earnings per share, or share-price 
related metrics, such as total shareholder return.67  And performance may be 
measured on an absolute basis or relative to the performance of a group of peer 
companies or a broad market index.68 
 
 Performance share awards that include only stock price or market measures 
of performance, such as total shareholder return, either absolute or relative, are 
valued and accounted for using the same approach that is used for options.  A grant 
date fair value is determined for these instruments using a model, generally a Monte 
Carlo simulation.69  The grant date fair value is then expensed over the period 
between award grant and settlement with no adjustment for changes in share price 
in the interim.70  The compensation expense is adjusted to reflect shares that are 
expected not to vest because of forfeitures due to failure to meet the retention 
requirement, but there is no adjustment solely because it later appears that 
performance targets will not be met.71 
 
 Apparently, the FASB has concluded that performance share awards utilizing 
other metrics (most commonly accounting-based measures of performance) cannot 
be adequately valued at grant.72  The FASB has adopted a method that it refers to as 
performance condition accounting for these instruments, 73 and which I will 
                                                        
64 See Walker, supra note 41, at 14-25. 
65 See Walker, supra note 41, at 14-25. 
66 See Walker, supra note 41, at 14-25. 
67 See Walker, supra note 41, at 14-25.  Although there are complicating factors, earnings 
per share (EPS) is essentially the net income available to common shareholders divided by 
the weighted average number of common shares outstanding during the relevant period.  
As such, it is an accounting measure of performance.  SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 6, at 197.  
Total shareholder return for a period is the sum of the change in the value of a firm’s 
common shares and per share dividends paid over that period, normally expressed as a 
percentage of share value at the beginning of the relevant period.  It is a market measure of 
performance.  ZVI BODIE ET AL., INVESTMENTS 45 (5th ed. 2002). 
68 See Walker, supra note 41, at 14-25. 
69  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-30-14 
[hereinafter ASC 718-10-34]; 718-10-55-13 to 55-20.  See also PWC, supra note 28, at 1-21, 
6-2 to 6-37.  Typically, these plans are too complex for application of the BSM methodology. 
70 ASC 718-10-30-14, supra note 69; ASC 718-10-35-2, supra note 47.  See also PWC, supra 
note 28, at 1-21, 1-24.   
71 ASC 718-10-30-14, supra note 69.  See also PWC, supra note 28, at 1-21. 
72 BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 12 n. 11. 
73 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-20; ASC 718-
10-30-12, 13; PWC, supra note 28, at 1-21. 
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sometimes refer to as partial mark-to-market accounting.  For these instruments, 
firms are required to determine, at grant and periodically afterwards, the number of 
shares that is most probable to vest.74  The expense associated with these 
instruments is the grant date share price multiplied by the number of shares 
probable to vest.75  Over time, only the number of shares is adjusted for new 
information about the likelihood of retention or performance attainment; the share 
price is not updated; hence, partial mark to market.76 
 
E. Other Equity-Based Compensation Instruments 
 
 We have now covered the most commonly used equity pay instruments, but 
less popular alternatives do exist.  For example, some firms issue cash-settled 
performance awards that are analogous to the performance shares I have just 
described.77  These plans may or may not utilize share price or market metrics, such 
as total shareholder return.  Like cash-settled SARs, these instruments are 
considered liabilities and their values are marked to market.  The ultimate expense 
recognized for cash-settled performance awards is set equal to the value realized by 
the recipient.   
 
 For completeness, I should also note that many firms include equity pay in 
their annual incentive programs.  These instruments raise no serious accounting 
challenges because of their short-term nature.  The compensation cost associated 
with these instruments is simply the value realized by the recipient within the 
relevant period.78 
 
III.  Designing an Optimal Accounting Approach for Equity-Based Pay 
 
 
                                                        
74 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-25-20; PWC, 
supra note 28, at 1-21.  Outcomes are probable if “the future event(s) are likely to occur.”  
ASC Topic 450.  Where several future outcomes are possible, as in the case of performance 
share plans with variable numbers of shares potentially vesting, accounting accruals prior 
to vesting are based on the most probable outcome at any given measurement point. 
75  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-55-10 
(defining the “fair value” of a restricted stock grant subject to a performance condition). 
76 A performance share award may contain both performance and market conditions, 
further complicating valuation and reporting.  See Walker, supra note 41, at 36. 
77 HAY GROUP, supra note 54, at 21 (reporting that 16% of 300 firms studied made cash-
settled performance awards in 2012 (versus 78% issuing performance-based stock and 5% 
issuing performance-based options). 
78 Susan Eichen & Eric Scoones, Annual Incentive Plan Design Considerations, in EXECUTIVE 
COMPENSATION 35, 63 (Yale D. Tauber & Donald R. Levy eds. 2002). 
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 As we have seen, the current equity pay landscape and accounting 
treatments are diverse, ranging from grant date fair value accounting (options, 
RS/RSUs, and some performance shares), to partial mark-to-market accounting 
(other performance shares), to full mark-to-market accounting (cash-settled SARs 
and performance awards).79  Compensation cost is generally recognized over the 
vesting period of the award, but the recognition period extends to exercise for SARs.  
While some diversity in accounting treatments may be inevitable given the diversity 
in instruments, diversity in accounting often leads to accounting-driven 
compensation design choices, which is suboptimal.   
 
Is this variation unavoidable?  More fundamentally, what would the optimal 
accounting regime for equity pay look like?  This Part details the considerations that 
would feed into the design of an optimal approach.  It considers both the FASB’s 
priorities as well as “non-accounting” corporate governance factors.  To some 
extent, this Part can be read as a critique of the FASB’s current preference for 
accounting based on grant-date valuation. 
 
A. The FASB’s Approach to Accounting for Equity Pay 
 
 The FASB’s overarching objective is to promulgate accounting standards that 
provide useful information to investors and creditors of reporting companies.80  
That information should be relevant.  It should faithfully represent the underlying 
economic phenomena, avoiding bias.  The information should be comparable and 
consistent from firm to firm and across time.  And it should be verifiable, 
understandable, and timely.81  But as Professor Stephan Penman has noted, 
demanding that financial statements reflect “economic reality” and be “true and fair” 
is only a starting point for the promulgation of rules and standards.82 
 
 In the specific case of equity pay, the objective is to recognize the cost to the 
entity of the services of the employees who receive the share-based pay 
instruments.83  This compensation cost is to be measured based on the “fair value” 
                                                        
79 As noted supra note 50, the approach that I refer to as “mark to market” might more 
accurately be termed “mark to model.”  However, having adopted the “mark to market” 
term, I will now stop quibbling with myself. 
80 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., Conceptual Framework: Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts No. 8, Sept. 2010, at 1 [hereinafter SFAC 8].  See also SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, 
at 51-52. 
81 SFAC 8, supra note 80, at 16.  See also SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 51-52. 
82 Stephen H. Penman, The Quality of Financial Statements: Perspectives from the Recent 
Stock Market Bubble, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS SUPP. 77, 79 (2003). 
83 ASC 718-10-10-1, supra note 27. 
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of the instrument.84  Detailed guidelines are provided to assist companies in 
determining the fair value of various awards in various circumstances.85 
 
 These guidelines first distinguish between awards of equity instruments and 
awards that constitute liabilities.86  Grants that are settled with stock are generally 
treated as equity issuances, not as liabilities.  Equity awards include stock options, 
RS/RSUs, and performance-based stock and option awards.87  Cash settled awards, 
such as SARs and cash-settled performance awards, are generally treated as 
liabilities.88  Awards treated as liabilities are accounted for on a mark-to-market 
basis, as described in Part II.89  Equity awards are expensed based on the “fair value” 
of the award.  But as we saw in Part II, calculation of that fair value differs 
depending on whether the instrument is an option, RS/RSU, or performance share.90 
 
 I think it is fair to characterize the FASB’s position as preferring grant date 
measurement/valuation of equity awards, when possible.91  In the 2004 statement 
that mandated expensing of stock options based on grant date valuation, the FASB 
discussed the pros and cons of the various alternatives, including mark-to-market 
accounting for these instruments.92  The statement noted several arguments 
advanced by advocates of mark-to-market accounting: that compensatory options 
should be considered liabilities, that mark-to-market or exercise date measurement 
is a better measure of compensation paid than grant date measurement, and that 
exercise date measurement is simple and straightforward, as contrasted with grant 
date valuation of options which requires application of complex mathematical 
models that were designed for tradeable options, not non-tradeable, 
nontransferable employee options.93 
                                                        
84  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-10-2 
[hereinafter ASC 718-10-10-2].  It is important to distinguish the FASB’s mandate that firms 
determine and expense the “fair value” of equity pay awards from the larger controversy 
within the profession concerning “fair value” accounting.  The latter controversy has mainly 
to do with accounting for investments on a current “fair value” basis as opposed to an 
historical cost basis.  This became a significant issue and a political issue during the 2008 
financial crisis when market values of certain securities plummeted and were difficult to 
discern in thinly traded markets.  See SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 6, at 17.  In the case of 
equity pay awards, there is no historical cost basis to fall back upon, and each of the 
methods specified by FASB in ASC 718 are encompassed in the term “fair value based” 
accounting.  ASC 718-10-10-2.   
85 See generally FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718. 
86 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B117. 
87 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B117. 
88 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B117. 
89 Supra text accompanying note 50. 
90 Supra text accompanying notes 44-47, 59-61, 69-71  
91 This may not be the preference of the members in isolation, but may reflect the 
preferences of industry and political reality.  See infra Part V. 
92 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B34-48. 
93 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B43-45. 
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 In mandating grant date measurement of stock option value, the FASB 
stressed that the instruments are better characterized as issuances of equity, not as 
liabilities; that the grant date is the date on which the employer and employee agree 
to the terms of the exchange, and presumably the parties base their agreement on 
the fair value of the instrument at that time; and that measuring compensation cost 
at a later date, such as at vesting or exercise, would include in compensation cost 
“both the value of the consideration exchanged for services and the return to the 
holder of the instrument from subsequent changes in its value.”94  The FASB also 
noted that the overwhelming majority of those responding to the invitation to 
comment on the draft rules, and who responded on this particular point, preferred 
grant date measurement to the alternatives.95 
 
 There have been no relevant FASB promulgations since the 2004 statement 
that adopted grant date fair value accounting for stock options.  Thus, there is no 
reason to think that the Board’s position has changed.  Moreover, the accounting 
rules for performance shares appear to reflect a similar preference for grant date 
valuation.  For instruments for which model-based grant date valuation is feasible – 
performance shares incorporating share price or stock market metrics – grant date 
measurement/valuation is mandated.  Partial mark-to-market accounting applies to 
instruments that incorporate accounting metrics or other measures of performance 
that are not amenable to ex ante valuation.  As in the case of options, if and when 
valuation techniques improve sufficiently to generate reliable ex ante measurement 
of the value of these instruments, presumably the FASB will mandate their use. 
 
B. A Reconsideration of the FASB’s Position and Other Considerations 
Favoring Realization-Based Accounting 
 
 It is not clear within FASB’s own conceptual framework nor from a corporate 
governance perspective that FASB’s emphasis on grant date measurement of equity 
pay instruments is appropriate.  Moreover, the arguments favoring realization-
based accounting for equity pay would seem to be even stronger today than they 
were in 2004 when the FASB last publicly addressed the issue. 
 
1. Equity vs. Liability 
 
 The distinction between firm equity and liabilities – the two components of 
the right hand side of the balance sheet – is fundamental to financial accounting, but 
the dividing line is actually contested.  The FASB defines a liability as an obligation 
                                                        
94 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B46. 
95 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B48. 
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to transfer an asset.96  Cash is an asset, but common shares of a company are not 
assets; that’s equity.  Thus, a conventional option that entails an obligation to sell 
shares to an optionee is not a liability, but is the issuance of an equity instrument.97  
On the other hand, an economically equivalent obligation that is to be settled in cash 
(a cash-settled SAR) is treated as a liability.98  The FASB’s approach is consistent 
with the “entity” view of equity.99  Any issuance of shares to either pre-existing or 
potential new shareholders is equity.  From the entity’s perspective, it’s all equity. 
 
 The alternative “proprietorship” view takes the perspective of the pre-
existing shareholders.100  From that perspective, the issuance of a conventional 
option is a liability – a liability of the pre-existing shareholders to issue new shares 
(or buy back shares) to deliver to the optionee on exercise.101  
 
 From a corporate governance perspective, of course, it is difficult to 
comprehend why the distinction between an instrument being characterized as an 
equity instrument versus as a liability should drive its accounting treatment.  The 
accounting treatment aside, the equity/liability distinction has no impact on the 
choices that firms make with respect to compensation instruments.  For example, 
stock options and cash-settled SARs are economically equivalent.  Public companies 
should generally be indifferent between issuing options on actual shares and 
promising cash payments based on share price appreciation.102  But as a result of 
                                                        
96 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., Statement of Fin. Accounting Concepts No. 6, Dec. 1985, at 
13 (amended 2008). 
97 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B117. 
98 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B117. 
99 See, e.g., James A. Ohlson & Stephen H. Penman, Debt vs. Equity: Accounting for Claims 
Contingent on Firms’ Common Stock Performance 27 (Ctr. for Excellence in Acct. and Security 
Analysis at Columbia Bus. Sch. White Paper No. 1, Jan. 2005). 
100 See, e.g., Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 27.  For more on the entity and 
proprietorship theories, see generally SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 6, at 516-18. 
101 Consistent with the proprietorship perspective, Landsman, Pennell, Pope, and Yeh show 
as a theoretical matter that mark-to-market accounting for stock options best captures the 
economic impact on existing shareholders, and they provide empirical evidence supporting 
this view.  Wayne R. Landsman et al., Which Approach to Accounting for Employee Stock 
Options Best Reflects Market Pricing?, 11 REV. ACCT. STUDIES 203, 208, 243 (2006). 
102 In practice, the distinction between options and cash-settled SARs is even more 
insignificant than it would appear at first blush.  Many companies that grant options provide 
for cashless exercise.  Absent cashless exercise, an optionee is required to forward cash or 
previously owned shares equal to the exercise price to the company in order to exercise her 
option.  With cashless exercise, a broker loans the optionee the exercise price and is repaid 
almost immediately with a portion of the proceeds of exercise.  With cashless exercise, an 
optionee can fully convert option gains into cash (equivalent to a cash-settled SAR) or can 
convert just enough shares into cash to cover the exercise price and withholding taxes.  
Alden & Akresh, supra note 49, at 173-74. Under FASB rules, cashless exercise of options 
does not trigger the mark-to-market accounting regime that is applicable to virtually 
identical cash-settled SARs.  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 
CODIFICATION 718-10-25-16. 
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the equity/liability distinction, options are valued at grant for accounting purposes, 
once and for all; SARs are marked to market.   
 
 The equity/liability distinction may be in flux.  A minority of the Financial 
Accounting Standards Committee of the American Accounting Association favored 
treating stock options as liabilities in 1994 when the committee endorsed expensing 
options generally,103 and a number of commentators have continued to advocate for 
that position since.104  Moreover, the FASB has indicated that it intends to revisit the 
issue.105   
 
Whether or not the broader issue ultimately is addressed by the FASB, it 
seems unwise to allow the equity/liability distinction to drive the accounting 
treatment of equity compensation.  If liability treatment for all forms of equity pay is 
more appropriate and useful, given the various considerations explored below, then 
arguably an exception should be made if the current entity-focused framework is 
maintained. 106   Of course, consistency is important, but from a corporate 
governance perspective the accounting consistency that is most important is 
consistency between various pay instruments, not between the grant of options to 
employees and, say, the issuance of warrants to third parties.107   
 
2. Treatment of Investment/Risk Returns 
 
 The key difference between grant date and mark-to-market accounting for 
equity compensation lies in the treatment of changes in value after the grant.  
Should we view as the opportunity cost to shareholders what an equivalent 
instrument could have been sold for at grant (excluding actual gains and losses 
                                                        
103 AMERICAN ACCOUNTING ASSOCIATIONS FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS COMMITTEE, Response to 
the FASB Exposure Draft “Accounting for Stock-Based Compensation,” 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 114, 
114 (1994). 
104 See, e.g., Steven Balsam, Extending the Method of Accounting for Stock Appreciation Rights 
to Employee Stock Options, 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 52 (1994) (advocating application of SAR 
accounting to options); Michael Kirschenheiter et al., Accounting for Employee Stock Options, 
18 ACCT. HORIZONS 135 (2004) (advocating liability treatment for options); Penman, supra 
note 82, at 79-83 (advocating the proprietorship approach and treatment of options as 
liabilities); Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 29 (same); Letter of Comment No. 20 for 
Fair Acct. Standards Bd., Kenneth E. Stone & Ronald D. Niemeyer, Accounting for Stock-
Based Compensation 6 (Received Nov. 2002), available at 
http://www.fasb.org/cs/BlobServer?blobcol=urldata&blobtable=MungoBlobs&blobkey=id
&blobwhere=1175818119143&blobheader=application%2Fpdf  (arguing that “non-
transferable [options] are not in substance equity instruments”). 
105 FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., STATEMENT OF FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 150 (2003); 
see also Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 10-11. 
106 Balsam, supra note 104, at 58 (taking a similar position with respect to options). 
107 But see Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 1-2 (stressing the importance of applying a 
consistent approach to accounting for all performance contingent claims on a corporation, 
including employee options, warrants, convertible preferred stock, etc.). 
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thereafter) or the actual cost incurred by the shareholders at settlement (including 
those fluctuations)?  Commentators have argued both sides, but contributions to 
this debate are generally of a “self-evident” flavor.  In rejecting post-grant re-
valuation of stock options, the FASB stated its view that it would be inappropriate to 
include the effects of changes in the value of an equity pay instrument in a firm’s 
income statement,108 and that position is commonly encountered in the accounting 
literature.109   On the other hand, some more recent thinking on the subject supports 
including post-grant fluctuations in reporting the “total economic cost to the 
shareholders.”110  Each side seems to have a point.  How are we to decide?  This 
section will offer a principled basis for considering whether compensation cost 
should or should not include actual investment returns and will argue that, while 
not free of doubt, the case for including these returns (i.e., for mark-to-market 
accounting) is reasonably persuasive today. 
 
 Let us first be clear about how investment returns are dealt with under the 
various accounting regimes.  Grant date values of stock options and performance 
shares with market conditions include expected investment returns.111  Grant date 
valuation is equivalent to the expected return discounted to present value.112  
Although it isn’t obvious, the current market price of a share of restricted stock or 
an RSU can also be thought of as including expected investment returns.  In theory, 
the value of a share of stock is based on the discounted stream of cash flows the 
company is expected to generate.113  Full mark-to-market accounting, as applies 
currently to cash-settled SARs, results in actual investment returns being included 
in compensation cost.  Partial mark-to-market accounting, as applies currently to 
performance share plans with accounting-based metrics, includes expected 
investment returns.  Although the compensation cost associated with these 
instruments rises or falls depending on the number of shares that is probable to vest 
from time to time, share price movements do not factor into compensation cost 
measurement for these awards.  The share price is fixed at grant. 
 
                                                        
108 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B47. 
109 See, e.g., MORTON BACKER, MODERN ACCOUNTING THEORY 280 (Morton Backer ed. 1966) 
(stating that “any attempt to measure the compensation effected by the stock option … must 
separate compensation from investment,” which can only occur at grant). 
110 Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 21 (emphasis in original).  Similarly, Balsam, supra 
note 104, at 56, argues that under the SAR mark-to-market approach, the cumulative 
accounting expense reflects the opportunity cost to the firm.  That’s true; it reflects the 
opportunity cost at settlement, but the question remains whether the opportunity cost of 
the grant or settlement is the better measure of compensation cost.  See also Penman, supra 
note 82, at 83 (arguing that inclusion of expected returns is inadequate); Landsman et al., 
supra note 101, at 243 (showing theoretically and empirically that mark-to-market 
accounting for stock options grants is most value relevant for existing shareholders). 
111 Penman, supra note 82, at 83. 
112 HULL, supra note 45, at 299. 
113 Bodie et al., supra note 67, at 563. 
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 Is it more appropriate to base compensation cost on expected or actual 
investment returns?  It depends.  Consider two compensation schemes. 
 
 First, suppose an employee of Acme receives a salary of $100,000 plus an 
opportunity to flip a coin at the end of the year.114  If heads, the employee receives 
an additional $50,000; if tails, the employee receives no additional pay.  Assuming a 
fair coin, the expected payoff is $25,000, and the employee’s total expected 
compensation for the year is $125,000.  In this situation, since the coin-flip result is 
exogenous, including expected returns ($25,000) but not actual returns (0 or 
$50,000) in compensation cost more faithfully represents the underlying economics 
and promotes comparability and consistency.  This compensation scheme is 
identical to one in which Acme pays the employee $125,000 cash and the employee 
separately makes a $25,000 bet on a coin flip.   Including actual returns in 
compensation cost would only introduce noise that would make it harder to 
compare costs from firm to firm or over time given the randomness in the coin flip 
result.   
 
 Compare a compensation scheme in which a retail sales employee receives a 
salary of $10,000 per year plus a $10 commission for every sweater she sells.  
Suppose expected sales based on historical averages are 250 sweaters per year, 
yielding an expected commission of $2,500.  In this situation, it is more appropriate 
to include the actual commission paid in compensation cost, not the expected 
commission of $2,500.  The commission result is at least partially endogenous.  It 
reflects, in part, the skill and effort of the employee. 115  Unlike the coin-flip bonus, 
one cannot separate the commission from the compensation.  Including actual 
results does not increase noise; it increases accuracy of compensation cost 
measurement.  And GAAP reflects this commonsensical result, requiring actual 
commissions paid to be included in compensation cost.116 
 
 So is equity compensation more like a coin flip or a sales commission?  Are 
actual returns on equity pay instruments endogenous or exogenous?  Well, some of 
both, but actual returns are increasingly endogenous.  And when we consider that 
the objective is to calculate compensation cost firm wide, there is a strong argument 
for including actual returns in compensation cost. 
 
 This was less true ten to fifteen years ago when conventional stock options 
and RS/RSUs dominated long-term equity pay.  Of course, even in that situation 
there was some endogeneity.  If equity pay was used widely within the firm and if 
we take the incentives created by equity pay seriously, conventional option payoffs 
reflect, to some degree, the effort and skill of the employees, and inclusion of actual 
                                                        
114 I thank Gregg Polsky for pushing the coin-flip perspective. 
115 It is also partially exogenous.  No matter how skillful and persuasive the clerk, she will 
not be able to overcome a particularly unattractive line of sweaters. 
116 Put differently, nothing in GAAP requires or permits retail sales commissions to be 
expensed at any amount other than the amount actually paid. 
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results in compensation cost increases accuracy, just as with sales commissions.117  
The problem is that the link between pay and performance was so tenuous.  The 
payoff associated with non-indexed stock and option grants often reflects overall 
market movements as much or more than firm-specific performance.118 
 
 But consider a firm that adopts a relative total shareholder return plan and 
makes awards widely through the executive and managerial ranks.  The number of 
shares that are ultimately issued under these plans is a function of the firm’s stock 
price (and dividend) performance relative to a broad market index or a peer group.  
So the noise of market movements is reduced, and payouts are tied more closely to 
firm-specific performance within the employees’ control.119  Of course, individual 
employees, even in the executive suite, have limited impact on that performance, 
but, again, the goal is to measure firm-wide compensation cost.  On a firm-wide 
basis, a compensation cost measure that includes actual returns generated by a 
relative total shareholder return plan is arguably superior to one based on expected 
returns.120 
 
 The FASB voiced another, related argument for adopting grant-date fair 
value accounting for stock options and other equity pay grants and rejecting mark-
to-market accounting: “In deciding whether and on what terms to exchange equity 
instruments for employee services, both parties to the agreement presumably base 
their decisions on the current fair value of the instrument to be exchanged-not its 
possible value at a future date.”121  Setting aside the fact that, with the exception of 
the CEO and perhaps a handful of senior executives, equity pay grants are generally 
made unilaterally, this statement again reflects a mindset in which returns are 
exogenous.  If an award’s payoff is tied to the S&P 500 or coin flips, the assumption 
                                                        
117 See Robert S. Kaplan & Krishna G. Palepu, Expensing Stock Options: A Fair-Value 
Approach, HARV. BUS. REV. 105, 107 (Dec. 2003) (describing as the “chief characteristic of 
stock option compensation” that “employees are receiving part of their compensation in the 
form of a contingent claim on the value they are helping to produce”); Stone & Niemeyer, 
supra note 104, at 7 (options “are analogous to offering a profit-based bonus as part of a 
compensation plan”). 
118 See, e.g., Alfred Rappaport, New Thinking on How to Link Executive Pay with Performance, 
HARV. BUS. REV. 91, 92 (Mar./Apr. 1999) (noting that “for the ten-year period ending in 1997, 
total return to shareholders—dividends plus increases in the share price—was positive for 
each of the 100 largest U.S. companies”). 
119 Under a typical relative total shareholder return (TSR) plan, the number of shares issued 
is a function of relative TSR.  The value of these shares, however, is partially a function of 
market movements.  So relative TSR plans tighten the relationship between pay and firm-
specific performance, but do not completely insulate pay from market movements.  See 
Walker, supra note 41. 
120 This feature is not unique to relative TSR plans.  Performance shares incorporating 
accounting or other non-market metrics such as safety performance also seem to be more 
akin to commissions than are conventional option and stock grants.  The use of multiple 
metrics may further tighten the link between employee performance, outcomes, and pay. 
121 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B46. 
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that both parties focus on grant date valuation would be reasonable.  Perhaps it is 
also a fair assumption with respect to individual rank and file employees receiving 
company stock or options.  But would a senior company executive base her 
decisions on equity pay on the current fair market value or on her expectation of 
value at payout?  These folks are not known for their humility.  More germanely, 
would a compensation committee that adopted a firm-wide equity pay plan assume 
that the share price going forward was just a random walk?  If so, what was the 
point to granting these equity incentives? 
 
 One sometimes hears the related argument that grant date valuation of 
equity pay instruments is appropriate because this is a measure of the firm’s 
opportunity cost.122  One response to this argument is that firms never sell the types 
of equity instruments they issue to their employees.123  A better response, however, 
is similar to the argument in the preceding paragraph.  If a firm sold instruments to 
third parties with a payoff linked to total shareholder return, it would not expect 
those instruments to have an impact on employee incentives and firm performance.  
It is the fact that these instruments are granted to individuals who have the 
collective ability to improve firm performance that matters.  That makes the payoffs 
endogenous, and that bolsters the case for ex post evaluation of compensation cost. 
 
To be sure, today’s equity pay landscape is diverse.  Conventional options 
haven’t disappeared.  Performance share plans, including relative total shareholder 
return plans are ascendant, but not dominant the way options were in the late 
1990s.124  The argument is simply that, in aggregate, shifts in compensation 
practices improve the case for including actual returns in compensation cost, i.e., 
marking to market.  But I certainly do not mean to suggest that we make this 
decision firm-by-firm or instrument-by-instrument.  The goal is to avoid accounting-
driven design decisions, not promote them.  I will have more to say about this point 
in Part III.B.4 below. 
 
But before we leave the topic of actual versus expected returns, there is a 
final point we should consider for completeness.  Tying compensation expense to 
realized equity pay gains may serve an earnings-smoothing function.125  This is most 
obviously the case when a performance share plan utilizes earnings per share, 
                                                        
122 See, e.g., Jennifer Saiz, Expensing the Cost of Executive Option Schemes: Case Studies in the 
Australian Healthcare Industry, J.L. & FIN. MGMT. (2003) (“Given that companies can issue 
warrants in the market and receive the fair value of those warrants in the form of income, 
there is an opportunity cost associated with the granting of stock options to employees.”).  
123 Compensatory stock options are uniformly nontransferable and may not be immediately 
exercised, unlike market-traded options.  HULL, supra note 45, at 333. 
124 Supra text accompanying notes 1, 34. 
125 Kirschenheiter et al., supra note 104, at 154. 
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EBITDA,126 or another earnings-related measure, as a metric.  Strong earnings 
performance over the performance period will result in the issuance of a large 
number of shares and high realized compensation cost; poor performance results in 
few or no shares being issued and low realized compensation.  Marking the 
performance shares to market includes these swings in the final measure of 
compensation expense and tends to smooth earnings relative to accounting for 
these shares based on a fixed, grant date valuation.127    
 
While this earnings-smoothing function is most obvious when equity payouts 
are based on earnings, it can occur with any plan under which the payouts are 
correlated with earnings.  Since share price is correlated with earnings, even 
conventional stock options and RS/RSUs could serve this function to some degree.  
Generally, corporate finance professionals prefer smooth to variable earnings, all 
else being equal.128  Given that, one might think that firms would prefer SARs, which 
are marked to market, over conventional stock options, which are valued once and 
for all at grant.  They do not.  The clear preference is for actual options.  There is no 
tax difference,129 so it is likely that the explanation has to do with accounting.  One 
possibility is that the earnings-smoothing benefit is small or does not exist, or is 
relatively unimportant to management.  Another might be that the flip side of the 
earnings-smoothing benefit is that compensation cost under a mark-to-market 
scheme is unpredictable. 130   The perceived cost of compensation expense 
uncertainty may outweigh the earnings-smoothing benefits. 
                                                        
126 An acronym for “earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization.”  This is 
an important measure of earnings often used in debt covenants and incentive pay 
arrangements.  See SCHROEDER ET AL., supra note 5, at 477.  
127 In Accounting Standards Update No. 2016-09, “Improvements to Employee Share-Based 
Payment Accounting” (March 30, 2016), the FASB revised the accounting rules applicable to 
employer tax deductions for equity pay.  Formerly, earnings reflected only expected tax 
deductions for equity compensation.  Under the new rules, employers must adjust earnings 
for the difference between actual tax deductions and expected deductions.  This change will 
generally result in increased earnings volatility.  See Nancy Nichols et al., Consequences of 
New Employee Share-Based Payment Rules, 152 TAX NOTES 851 (Aug. 8, 2016). 
While realization-based accounting for compensation cost arising from equity pay should 
generally reduce earnings volatility, Kirschenheiter, Mathur, and Thomas point out 
(Kirschenheiter et al., supra note 104, at 154) that mark-to-market accounting for equity 
pay can increase earnings volatility if equity pay adjustments are concentrated in a single 
year and larger earnings impacts are spread over several years.  See infra text 
accompanying note 219 for further discussion of this potential problem as well as a possible 
solution.  
128 See John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions, 62(6) FIN. 
ANALYSTS J. 27, 33 (2006) (97% of CFOs responding to a survey reported preferring a 
smooth earnings path to a bumpy one and 78% indicated a willingness to sacrifice value to 
achieve smooth earnings).  
129 MYRON S. SCHOLES ET AL., TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A PLANNING APPROACH 202 (2nd ed. 
2002). 
130 While compensation cost is certainly less predictable if equity pay instruments are 
marked to market, concerns that a short-term market swing could result in a single year 
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3. Valuation Uncertainty, Manipulation and Obfuscation 
 
 It has always been a challenge to generate accurate and verifiable ex ante 
values for equity pay instruments,131 and that challenge has increased considerably 
with the shift away from conventional options in favor of more complex 
performance share plans.132  There is greater uncertainty regarding the tools of 
valuation and their application.  Disclosure is less effective.  And firms have greater 
opportunities to select favorable modeling assumptions that minimize reported 
compensation cost, which I will refer to as manipulation.133  Of course, valuation 
technology and reporting regulation may catch up with the evolution in pay 
instruments, but at the moment these difficulties suggest minimizing our reliance on 
ex ante valuation.  To some extent, the FASB has done so in applying partial mark-
to-market accounting to performance shares incorporating accounting-based 
metrics.  But these realities strengthen the case for adopting full mark-to-market 
accounting for equity pay generally.  This is not to suggest that adoption of 
performance share plans is a mistake for corporate governance.  The pros may 
outweigh the cons.  I am inclined to think that they do.134  But we should not ignore 
the impact of increased complexity on accounting for equity pay. 
 
a. Ex Ante Valuation 
 
The FASB has acknowledged that ex ante valuation difficulties might supply 
an argument for realization-based accounting, although to my knowledge the Board 
has never directly addressed the manipulation question.  In adopting grant date fair 
value accounting for options in 2004, the FASB noted the arguments of mark-to-
market advocates that  
 
[c]oncerns about how to apply option-pricing models initially 
developed for traded options to forfeitable, nontransferable employee 
options are much less significant if final measurement is based on the 
intrinsic value, if any, that an employee realizes by exercising an 
option.  The usual accounting response to a major problem in 
measuring the effects of a transaction is to defer final measurement 
until the measurement difficulties are resolved.  Exercise date 
                                                                                                                                                                     
spike in compensation cost can be allayed.  As discussed infra Part III(B)(2), several 
commentators have proposed an approach that would true final compensation cost to 
realized results, but that would smooth the impact on earnings across several periods.  Note 
that this is not the same thing as basing compensation cost on a grant date calculation of fair 
value as firms do today. 
131 See infra Part IV. 
132 BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 3. 
133 Walker, supra note 41, at 3. 
134 Walker, supra note 41, at 3. 
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measurement might be appropriate for that reason regardless of more 
conceptual considerations.135   
 
 Concerns about applying the Black-Scholes-Merton (BSM) option pricing 
model and other models designed for traded options to compensatory options were, 
and to some degree remain, legitimate.  These models were designed for relatively 
short-term traded options.  The models are not perfect in that service, but their 
imperfections are magnified when applied to long-dated employee options.136  A 
more general concern was that BSM was designed for European options that are 
exercisable on a specific date in the future, whereas compensatory options are 
exercisable over a range of dates between vesting and expiration.137  While the 
difference would be relatively unimportant for a traded option, which should be 
held by someone until just before expiration,138 employees holding compensatory 
options generally exercise them much earlier due to risk aversion or liquidity 
concerns.139  If her options were tradable, an employee seeking liquidity would sell 
to a third party and capture part of the remaining option value, but compensatory 
options cannot be sold and thus are generally exercised early.  While not a perfectly 
satisfactory fix,140 the BSM model was modified to include the expected holding 
                                                        
135 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at B45. 
136 See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Expensing Employee Stock Options 38 (AEI Economic Policy 
Working Paper Series, Aug. 5, 2005), (suggesting that valuation errors may exceed 20% in 
10% of the cases); Carol A. Marquardt, The Cost of Employee Stock Option Grants: An 
Empirical Assessment, 40 J. ACCT. RES. 1191, 1214 (2002) (finding that while an adjusted 
Black-Scholes model provided reasonable estimates of ex post option cost, on average, there 
was “significant variability in the amount of model error on an option-by-option basis”). 
137 Mark Rubinstein, On the Accounting Valuation of Employee Stock Options, 3 J. DERIVATIVES 
8 (1995).  Binomial models can explicitly incorporate the exercise date discretion afforded 
holders of American-style options, such as employee stock options.  Id. 
138 At any given time, the value of an option consists of the current intrinsic value (the gain 
that can be achieved if the option were exercised at that point) and some remaining time 
value (arising from the possibility that the option will increase in value prior to expiration).  
Since the total option value exceeds intrinsic value prior to expiration, market traded 
options should not be exercised before that date.  This simplified explanation ignores 
dividend payments, which can complicate the analysis.  HULL, supra note 45, at 225-26. 
139 See J. Carr Bettis et al., Exercise Behavior, Valuation, and the Incentive Effects of Employee 
Stock Options, 76 J. FIN. ECON. 445, 446 (2005) (finding for a sample of 140,000 option 
exercises by executives at almost 4000 firms between 1996 and 2002 that, on average, 
options were exercised a little over two years following vesting and more than four years 
prior to expiration); Jennifer N. Carpenter, The Exercise and Valuation of Executive Stock 
Options, 48 J. FIN ECON. 127, 138-39 (1998) (finding for a sample of forty firms (mainly large 
manufacturers) that executive stock options granted between 1983 and 1984 were, on 
average, exercised after 5.8 years); Steven Huddart & Mark Lang, Employee Stock Option 
Exercises: An Empirical Analysis, 21 J. ACCT. & ECON. 5, 20 (1996) (finding that the median 
fraction of option life elapsed at the time of exercise ranged from 0.21 to 0.38 for options 
granted by seven public companies to a wide range of employees). 
140 Some researchers have found that the adjustments to the pricing models made to reflect 
non-transferability can lead to overvaluation.  See Thomas Hemmer et al., Estimating the 
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period for a compensatory option, based on experience at a particular company, 
instead of the time to expiration, in order to generate a more realistic ex ante option 
value.141 
 
 Today, it is fair to say that most analysts are comfortable that the modified 
BSM and other approved valuation approaches provide reasonable estimates of the 
ex ante cost of compensatory stock options.142  But complex performance share 
plans are another matter.  As Professors Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpathy (BBCK) 
suggest, valuation is “significantly more problematic … once the grant relies on a 
complex vesting provision based on one or more … accounting, stock-price, sales, 
market-share, or other metric[s].”143  And in concluding their exhaustive empirical 
analysis of performance-vested equity pay plans, BBCK summarize the impact: “one 
consequence of the complexity associated with [performance-vesting] provisions is 
significant error in measurement of the [value and other characteristics] of 
executive compensation.”144 
 
 To provide a sense of the complexity without getting too deeply into the 
morass, let us compare ex ante valuation of a conventional stock option to that of a 
grant under a relative total shareholder return plan.  Chevron, for example, issues 
both forms of equity pay to its senior executives.  In its 2015 proxy statement and 
2014 annual report, Chevron reported that its CEO received an option in 2014 on 
344,000 shares.145  The company reported that the stock price at grant and the 
exercise price were $116/share, the expected time to exercise was six years, the 
expected stock price volatility was 30.3%, the risk-free interest rate was 1.9%, and 
                                                                                                                                                                     
“Fair Value” of Employee Stock Options with Expected Early Exercise, 8 ACCT. HORIZONS 23, 27-
38 (1994); Phelim Boyle & William R. Scott, Executive Stock Options and Concavity of the 
Option Price, 13 J. DERIVATIVES 72, 72-77 (2006). 
141 SFAS 123R, supra note 8, at A26-A30; see also Rubinstein, supra note 137. 
142 See, e.g., BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 3 (“It is not particularly difficult to value simple 
time-vested stock and options, or even primitive [performance-vested equity awards] . . . ”). 
Nondiversified employees receiving nontransferable options will place a lower value on the 
instruments than would a diversified third party, and thus option pricing models may not 
reflect the value perceived by the employee recipient.  See, e.g., Zvi Bodie et al., For the Last 
Time: Stock Options are an Expense, HARV. BUS. REV. 63, 67 (March 2003) (reporting 
estimates of perceived employee discounts of 20% to 50%).  But this is a separate 
governance issue that does not bear directly on the appropriate accounting for 
compensation cost.  If Acme pays its employee with a Mercedes that is worth $100,000, 
$100,000 is an accurate measure of compensation cost even if the employee only values the 
car at $75,000.  As Bodie, Kaplan, and Merton explain, “[f]inancial statements reflect the 
economic perspective of the company, not the entities (including employees) with which it 
transacts.”  Id. at 67. 
143 BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 3. 
144 BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 44. 
145 CHEVRON, 2015 PROXY STATEMENT (FORM DEF 14A) 46 (Apr. 9, 2015). 
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the expected dividend yield was 3.3%.146  Chevron reported a grant date fair value 
for this award of $8,586,240.147  I plugged these assumptions into a free online 
option pricing calculator and got a value of $8,517,440, a difference of less than 
1%.148 
 
 Chevron also reported that its CEO received a performance share award 
based on its total shareholder return relative to that of its peer group.  After three 
years, the CEO will receive between zero and 100,000 shares depending on its total 
shareholder return rank.149  The company reported a grant date fair value for this 
award of $4,816,500,150 derived as follows: 
 
We use a Monte Carlo approach to calculate estimated grant date fair 
value.  To derive estimated grant date fair value per share, this 
valuation technique simulates total shareholder return (TSR) for the 
Company and for our [peer group] (BP, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch 
Shell, and Total) using market data for a period equal to the term of 
the performance period, correlates the simulated returns within the 
peer group to estimate a probably payout value, and discounts the 
probable payout value using a risk-free rate for Treasury bonds…151  
 
 Of course, this is terribly obscure and impossible for an analyst to replicate, 
at least this analyst.  But the problem is not simply inadequate disclosure, although 
that may also be a problem.  These instruments are simply more complex than 
conventional options. 
 
 Sticking with relative total shareholder return plans, Radford, a 
compensation consultant, has published a short guide to valuation, which highlights 
the complexity.152  In addition to making assumptions regarding expected volatility, 
interest rates, and expected dividend yields, the analyst valuing a grant under one of 
these plans must also include data on the correlation between the share prices of 
the firm and the peer group of companies.153  There are several approaches for 
generating these correlation coefficients, and the choice of the approach, as well as 
the inputs, can affect the resulting valuation.154   
                                                        
146 CHEVRON, supra note 145, at 46 (Apr. 9, 2015) (strike price); CHEVRON, 2014 ANNUAL 
REPORT (Form 10-K) 59 (Feb. 20, 2015) (valuation assumptions). 
147 CHEVRON, supra note 145, at 46 (Apr. 9, 2015). 
148 Option Calculator, http://www.option-price.com/index.php (last visited Aug. 15, 2016). 
149 CHEVRON, supra note 145, at 38, 40. 
150 CHEVRON, supra note 145, at 46. 
151 CHEVRON, supra note 145, at 45. 




153 RADFORD, supra note 152. 
154 RADFORD, supra note 152. 
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 Unfortunately, it gets worse.  The FASB has essentially conceded that we 
currently lack the tools to generate adequate ex ante values for performance share 
awards that incorporate accounting-based metrics, such as earnings per share, or 
other non-share price metrics, such as safety performance.155  As discussed above, 
when these metrics are employed, firms are directed to use a partial mark-to-
market approach under which the share price is set at grant, once and for all, but the 
number of shares that is probable to vest is initially estimated, re-determined 
periodically, and ultimately set equal to the number of shares that actually vest, if 
any.156 
 
 The bottom line is that the shift towards performance shares represents a 
step backward for accurate ex ante valuation of equity pay and strengthens the 
argument for realization-based accounting. 
 
b. Manipulation and Obfuscation 
 
 Setting aside simple time-vested RS/RSUs, which are largely manipulation-
proof under any accounting approach, each accounting approach involves some 
opportunity for valuation manipulation.  The primary difference between grant date 
“fair value” accounting and partial mark-to-market accounting, on the one hand, and 
full mark-to-market accounting, on the other, is that the ultimate reported 
compensation expense under full mark-to-market accounting is much less 
manipulable. 157   Meanwhile valuation has become more obscure and the 
opportunities to select favorable valuation assumptions greater with the rise of 
performance shares, again bolstering the case for full mark-to-market or realization-
based accounting. 
 
 Recall that conventional options and performance share plans utilizing stock 
price or market metrics are currently valued at grant using an appropriate model.158  
The value derived determines both the grant date measure of compensation 
expense (important for proxy statement disclosures of executive pay) and the 
ultimate expense that is booked for employee compensation associated with the 
equity instrument. 159   There is no subsequent adjustment for stock price 
movements or changes in performance metrics.  The only adjustment is a minor one 
reflecting the expected and actual number of shares that fail to vest because of 
                                                        
155 BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 12 n.11. 
156 Supra text accompanying notes 72-76 
157 Of course, an employee could manipulate a firm’s stock price at exercise or settlement, 
which would impact realized compensation and reported compensation expense.  But 
because compensation cost is trued to employee realizations, the opportunity to manipulate 
valuation, independent of manipulating actions or disclosures, is largely eliminated with 
mark to market accounting. 
158 Supra Part II.A, D. 
159 Supra Part II.A, D. 
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employee terminations.160  Put crassly, firms have two reasons to cheat when grant 
date valuation applies throughout – to minimize reported grant date executive pay 
and to minimize reported firm-wide compensation cost. 
 
 By comparison, when mark-to-market accounting applies, as with cash-
settled SARs and performance plans currently, firms have only one reason to cheat – 
to minimize reported grant date executive pay.  Firm wide compensation cost will 
be trued up to match the realized payouts enjoyed by the employees. 
 
 As discussed, in the case of conventional stock options or SARs, grant date 
valuation requires the issuer to make assumptions regarding the stock’s expected 
volatility, interest rates, expected dividend yields, and expected time to exercise.161  
Discretion is required in selecting appropriate assumptions, and not surprisingly, 
firms tend to use this discretion to reduce the reported grant date “fair value” of 
options.162  
                                                        
160 Supra note 47. 
161 Supra text accompanying note 46.  
162 See Eli Bartov et al., Managerial Discretion and the Economic Determinants of the 
Disclosed Volatility Parameter for Valuing ESOs, 12 REV. ACCT. STUD. 155, 158 (2007) (finding 
in a sample of over 9000 firm-years from 1998 to 2004 that firms opportunistically selected 
volatility measures to reduce reported compensation); Preeti Choudhary, Evidence on 
Differences Between Recognition and Disclosure: A Comparison of Inputs to Estimate Fair 
Values of Employee Stock Options, 51 J. ACCT. & ECON. 77, 91 (2011) (finding that 
opportunistic selection of volatility assumptions to minimize option value and 
compensation cost increased after stock option expensing was mandated in 2004); Leslie 
David Hodder et al., Using Valuation Model Inputs to Manage Employee Stock Option 
Disclosures 3 (Working Paper, Apr. 2004), available at 
http://www.ibrarian.net/navon/paper/Using_Valuation_Model_Inputs_to_Manage_Employ
ee_S.pdf?paperid=1202774 (finding use of discretion to reduce pro forma earnings among a 
subset of firms); but see Steven Balsam et al., Managing Pro Forma Stock Option Expense 
under SFAS No. 123, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 31 (2003) (finding little evidence of manipulation of 
overall option expense but finding manipulation of allocation of expense to minimize the 
first year impact).  See also, Steven Balsam et al., Frontline Reaction to FASB 123(R), 203 J. 
ACCOUNTANCY 54, 55 (2007) (finding that 40% of a sample of companies reported reducing 
their volatility assumptions in the wake of mandated option expense recognition in 2004 
(versus 9% of firms that reported increasing volatility assumptions)).  Other studies 
document unintentional errors in stock option valuation and reporting.  See, e.g., Bratten et 
al., The Accuracy of Disclosures for Complex Estimates: Evidence From Reported Stock Option 
Fair Values, 52 ACCOUNTING, ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETY 32, 34-35. 
Accounting commentators have long recognized the manipulability of compensation cost 
based on the grant date valuation of options.  See Balsam, supra note 104, at 36 (preferring 
exercise date measurement for option compensation as being objective and verifiable); 
Lauren A. Maines et al., Evaluation of the IASB’s Proposed Accounting and Disclosure 
Requirements for Share-Based Payment, 18 ACCT. HORIZONS 65, 66, 70 (2004) (noting 
manipulation concern with cost estimates that are not trued up to actual results); Ohlson & 
Penman, supra note 99, at 19 (noting that the lack of cash exchange for compensatory 
options “raises the specter” of “manipulation opportunities”). 
 Realization-Based Accounting for Equity Pay  
 32 
 
 To some extent, however, disclosure rules limit the ability of firms to 
manipulate ex ante option values by opportunistically selecting assumptions.163  As 
we saw with Chevron, firms disclose their option pricing assumptions and the 
technology is available for analysts to confirm the results and re-run the analysis 
under differing assumptions.164  If I think that Chevron’s assumption of 30% 
volatility is too conservative, I can re-run the numbers with, say, 35% volatility and 
see how much this would increase the estimated ex ante value of the options.165 
 
 The opportunities to select favorable assumptions in valuing performance 
share plans would seem to be even greater.  As noted, plans that incorporate share-
price based metrics are accounted for just like options.  BBCK analyzed a sample of 
performance share grants incorporating absolute share-price metrics and found 
some error, but little bias, in company valuations.166  But, as we have seen, plans 
incorporating relative share price metrics, such as relative total shareholder return 
plans, involve even more complex and obscure assumptions regarding price 
correlations.167  Even if these assumptions were fully disclosed, it would be more 
difficult for outside analysts to confirm reported values or compare alternative 
scenarios.  As a result, firms are less likely to be called out for making modeling 
assumptions that reduce the ex ante value of these grants. 
 
 As a side note, although I’m not sure that improved disclosure of 
assumptions would matter much given the inherent complexity of these 
instruments, it is not clear whether the paucity of disclosure with respect to 
performance share plans with a market condition, e.g., Chevron’s disclosure quoted 
above, reflects a lack of guidance from the FASB or SEC or failure of firms to follow 
such guidance.  The FASB requires the disclosure of significant assumptions used in 
estimating the fair value of share price based awards, including, if applicable, 
                                                        
163 ASC 718 requires disclosure in a firm’s financial statements of “the significant 
assumptions used during the year to estimate the fair value (or calculated value) of share-
based compensation awards, including (if applicable)” expected term, expected volatility, 
expected dividends, and the risk-free rate.  FIN. ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING 
STANDARDS CODIFICATION 718-10-50-2(f) [hereinafter ASC 718-10-50-2(f)].  This disclosure 
requirement applies to all grants of equity pay awards.  In addition, SEC regulations require 
disclosure of the assumptions made in valuing stock and option awards made to the most 
senior company executives whose compensation is detailed in the summary compensation 
tables of company proxy statements. 17 C.F.R. §229.402(c)(2) (2015). 
164 Supra text accompanying notes 145-148. 
165 17%, as it turns out.  Ex ante option value is highly sensitive to volatility.  See Maines et 
al., supra note 163, at 70 (noting option valuation sensitivity to assumptions regarding 
volatility and dividend yields). 
166 BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 59 (Table 5) (finding for a sample of awards 
incorporating only an absolute stock price metric that company valuations were 13% lower, 
on average, than BBCK’s risk-adjusted valuations, but were 14% greater based on medians). 
167 Supra text accompanying note 119. 
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estimated volatility, interest rates, etc. 168   Like other firms that have issued relative 
total shareholder return awards, Chevron does not disclose specific assumptions 
such as these with respect to these grants.  Although disclosure of assumptions may 
not be sufficient to replicate Chevron’s valuation, it is not clear why disclosure is not 
required under GAAP. 
 
 The valuation reporting issues are slightly different with respect to 
performance shares with performance conditions (e.g., accounting metrics).  As we 
have seen, if an award is subject only to a performance condition, such as a range of 
earnings per share targets associated with increasing share awards, an issuer is 
directed to determine the number of shares that is (most) probable to vest at the 
time of grant and periodically afterwards.169  The reported ex ante value is simply 
the product of the number of shares probable to vest and the grant date share 
price.170  Over time, the number of shares probable to vest may vary, but the share 
price is held steady at the grant date price.171  Of course, the grant date share price 
is perfectly transparent for a public company, but the number of shares “probable to 
vest” is a complete black box.  Typically, the target number of shares for an award is 
also the number deemed most probable to vest at grant.172  This means, of course, 
that the corresponding performance target, e.g., 50th percentile earnings per share 
performance, is deemed by the board to be the most probable outcome over the 
performance period.   
 
 Firms are not required to disclose and do not disclose how they determine 
the most probable scenario for these awards.  A firm that wished to minimize ex 
ante valuation for these instruments would select a relatively low level of 
performance achievement and associated shares as being the most probable result 
at the time of grant.  This determination has no bearing on the design or outcome of 
the performance plan.  If actual performance far exceeds the level deemed most 
probable at grant, that can be chalked up to effective management.   
 
 However, there may be a check on companies minimizing reported 
compensation in this fashion.  Suppose a board believes that 50th percentile growth 
in earnings per share is the most likely outcome over the performance period, but is 
                                                        
168 ASC 718-10-50-2(f), supra note 163.  See Alexander Merz, Expensing Performance-Based 
Executive Stock Options: Is There Underreporting Under IFRS 2? 30-31 (Working Paper, Sept. 
2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2603726 (finding significant failure among 
German listed firms to provide mandated disclosure of performance-vested stock option 
valuation assumptions and data). 
169 Supra text accompanying note 74. 
170 Supra text accompanying note 75. 
171 Supra text accompanying note 76. 
172 For example, the Coca-Cola Company has issued performance shares utilizing an 
economic profit growth metric, a performance condition.  The disclosed grant date value of 
these awards is the product of the share price at grant and the number of shares that vest if 
target performance is achieved.  See THE COCA-COLA COMPANY, 2014 PROXY STATEMENT (FORM 
DEF 14-A) (Apr. 3, 2014) 63, 68. 
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considering reporting grant date valuation based on “most likely” performance of 
40th percentile earnings per share growth.  Doing so would reduce the number of 
shares probable to vest and the reported level of executive pay, but it also might 
send a pessimistic signal to the market that the board would prefer to avoid.173 
 
 Given current technology, a certain amount of under-reporting of the ex ante 
valuation of ever more popular performance share awards is probably unavoidable.  
It is important that we provide investors with an annual, ex ante picture of senior 
executive pay on as consistent a basis as possible.174  Thus, firms must be required 
to compute ex ante values using models where possible and to base ex ante values 
on the most probable number of shares to vest, when modeling is beyond our 
ability.  We can improve disclosure requirements, but we can’t expect to eliminate 
under-reporting of ex ante compensation value. 
 
But we do not have to base firm-wide expense for compensation cost arising 
from these instruments on these highly manipulable estimates.  Compensation cost 
can be tied to much less manipulable realized gains using mark-to-market 
accounting.  Doing so, as suggested above, would reduce the incentive to under-
report in the first place.  Doing so would also help level the playing the field between 
the various equity pay instruments that are on the menu at most public companies.  
It is unclear, for example, why conventional stock options have long dominated 
economically equivalent cash-settled SAR plans.  One possibility is that the mark-to-
market accounting treatment applied to SARs creates undesirable uncertainty with 
respect to compensation cost.  But another possibility is that under current GAAP 
firms can reduce the compensation cost associated with options (as well as reducing 
reported executive pay), by selecting favorable valuation assumptions, but they 
cannot do so with respect to SARs that are marked to market.  The growing 
popularity of performance share plans could also reflect, in part, the opportunity to 
minimize compensation expense under current accounting rules.  Subsection 5 
below will argue that avoiding accounting-induced compensation design choices 
provides yet further justification for shifting to realization-based accounting for all 
forms of equity pay.  Before turning to that analysis, however, let us consider 
another potential check on valuation manipulation – book/tax conformity. 
 
                                                        
173 I say “might” send a negative signal because it is not clear that this signal would be 
observed under current mandated disclosures.  Most plans of this type include threshold, 
target, and maximum performance levels and associated share grants, with interpolation in 
between these thresholds.  Typically, firms use the target level of shares as most probable to 
vest at grant, but there is no requirement that they do so.  A firm could adopt an aggressive 
target, sending a positive message to investors, all the while assigning a less aggressive level 
of performance as being most probable at the time of grant.  Even if disclosed, it is not clear 
to me that this would be picked up by many analysts. 
174 As suggested supra note 29, disclosure of aggregate ex ante compensation highlights 
board decision-making with respect to pay and facilitates cross-company comparison.  
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4. Improving Book/Tax Conformity 
 
When possible, managers generally prefer to report high income to their 
investors (by increasing reported income and/or reducing reported expenses) and 
low income to the tax authorities (by reducing reported income and/or increasing 
deductions).175  From a regulatory perspective, the attraction of conforming the 
recognition rules for financial or “book” accounting and tax is that when the rules 
are the same, the two spheres provide a natural check on gaming by managers.176  
The benefit of book/tax conformity is that it forces executives to choose.  They may 
be able to select a treatment that will increase income or decrease it, but not at the 
same time, for the same transaction.177  Given unavoidable executive discretion with 
respect to reporting, book/tax conformity is an elegant check on the tendency to 
have it both ways. 178   Full mark-to-market accounting improves book/tax 
conformity for equity compensation, which is a strong point in its favor.179   
 
With a few relatively unimportant exceptions, the corporate income tax 
deduction for equity compensation occurs at the point at which the employee 
realizes her gains, and the deduction is set equal to the amount of those gains.180  As 
we have seen, the book expense for options and performance shares is determined 
fully or partially at grant and is not trued up to reflect the realized gains of 
employees.  The result is a permanent difference between book expense and tax 
deductions for these equity pay instruments.  In a rising market, tax deductions for 
equity pay will permanently exceed the compensation cost reported to investors,181 
                                                        
175 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 129, at 141.   
176 David I. Walker & Victor Fleischer, Book/Tax Conformity and Equity Compensation, 62 
TAX L. REV. 399, 401 (2008-09). 
177 Walker & Fleischer, supra note 176, at 400. 
178 Walker & Fleischer, supra note 176, at 401. 
179 Walker & Fleischer, supra note 176, at 438. 
180 Incentive stock options (ISOs) represent one exception to this rule.  Under IRC 421 and 
422, employees are taxed not at exercise but on the sale of shares underlying ISOs, and the 
entire profit is taxed at capital gains rates.  However, employers are not allowed a deduction 
at any time for ISO grants.  ISOs should be relatively more attractive at firms that have low 
effective tax rates, but the tax code limits the value of ISO shares that can be granted to an 
employee, and thus the large majority of options issued to public company executives, at 
least, are not ISOs.  I.R.C. 422(d) (2012); SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 129, at 191-92 
(discussing tax treatment of ISOs); David I. Walker, Is Equity Compensation Tax 
Advantaged?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 695, 703 (2004) (explaining ISO limitations). 
Another exception is restricted stock grants subject to an IRC section 83(b) election.  When 
employees make that election, they are taxed on the value of the stock at grant, not when 
the stock vests.  I.R.C. § 83(b) elections are rarely made by employees of public companies 
but are not infrequently encountered at start-up companies. Id. at 707. 
181 Senator Carl Levin of Michigan has highlighted the discrepancy between corporate tax 
deductions for options and their book expense and, on several occasions, proposed 
legislation to limit tax deductions to the amount expensed.  See, e.g., Ending Corporate Tax 
Favors for Stock Options Act, S. 2116, 110th Cong. (2007); Ending Excessive Corporate 
Deductions for Stock Options Act, S. 1375, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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and, as or more importantly, underreporting of equity pay book expense has no 
impact on tax deductions.  There is no tax check. 
 
Full mark-to-market accounting for equity pay would true up book 
compensation cost to the realized gains of the employees, thus ultimately achieving 
book/tax conformity at the “tax” end of the spectrum.182  To be sure, a timing 
difference would remain.  Tax deductions are taken at realization, while book 
expense is recorded over the life of the equity instrument, but this timing difference 
is relatively unimportant compared with the current permanent difference.  
Elimination of the permanent difference would result in a single figure being 
reported for tax and aggregate book expense for equity pay and in the desired 
tension between book and tax expense. 
 
5. Avoiding Accounting Driven Design Choices 
 
From a corporate governance perspective, the ideal set of accounting (and 
tax) rules would have no influence on compensation design decisions.  
Compensation committees and boards would design pay packages for managers 
that optimize incentives, taking into account the competitive environment, 
managerial risk aversion, etc., but ignoring accounting (and tax) considerations.  
While there is still some debate as to whether equity compensation is tax 
advantaged versus cash,183 the tax treatment of various forms of equity pay – stock, 
options, SARs, performance shares – is relatively consistent today.184  But there are 
differences in accounting treatments – differences that have been magnified by the 
                                                        
182 Walker & Fleischer, supra note 176, at 436. 
183  Compare Walker, supra note 180, at 755-57 (2004) (concluding that equity 
compensation can produce a combined tax advantage (versus cash) for taxable firms and 
their employees if the firms properly hedge the grants, but finding little empirical evidence 
that firms do so) and Michael S. Knoll, The Tax Efficiency of Stock-Based Compensation, 103 
TAX NOTES 203, 214 (Apr. 12, 2004) (finding that equity compensation is tax advantaged 
“over a range of circumstances”) with Daniel Halperin, 2009 Erwin N. Griswold Lecture 
Before the American College of Tax Counsel: Rethinking the Advantage of Tax Deferral, 62 TAX 
LAWYER 535, 541-42 (2009) (suggesting that equity compensation is tax advantaged even if 
employer and employee face the same marginal rate because equity based returns are 
normally taxed to both corporation and shareholder but these returns are not taxed to the 
employee-recipient of equity pay). 
184 Under regular tax principles, employees include gains as ordinary income and employers 
are entitled to equivalent deductions on the vesting of restricted stock and the exercise of 
non-qualified options (and SARs).  See Walker & Fleischer, supra note 176, at 405-06.  
Incentive stock options are subject to a special regime, but are economically much less 
significant than NQSOs.  See infra note 180.  These basic rules can be complicated by 
employee elections under IRC section 83(b); by IRC section 162(m), which limits the 
deductibility of non-performance based compensation delivered to certain senior 
executives; and by IRC section 409A, which addresses non-qualified deferred compensation 
but can reach equity pay in certain circumstances.  See Walker & Fleischer, supra note 176, 
at 405-06. 
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increasing adoption of performance shares plans – that may be distorting 
compensation design choices.  Adopting full mark-to-market accounting for equity 
pay would not eliminate these distortions, but it would minimize them. 
 
 The situation could be, and has been, worse.  As we have seen, prior to 2004, 
stock options were subjected to a uniquely favorable accounting regime.185  While 
all other forms of pay resulted in an expense being recorded for compensation cost, 
option pay only had to be footnoted.186 Kevin Murphy has argued that this favorable 
accounting treatment contributed to the explosion in option use in the 1990s and 
early 2000s.187  This seems likely.  Certainly, option use has declined precipitously 
following the FASB’s adoption of the current option accounting rules in 2004, 
although, to be sure, other factors have undoubtedly played a role in the shift away 
from options.188 
 
 Today, we do not have a situation in which one equity pay instrument is a 
“free good” from an accounting perspective while others must be expensed.  The 
differences are subtler, but they are likely to distort design decisions, nonetheless.  
Some of these distortions are troubling; others less so. 
 
 Consider first the difference in accounting for economically equivalent stock 
options and cash-settled SARs.  Option expense is based on a calculation of grant 
date fair value.  As we have seen, companies have discretion to select modeling 
assumptions that reduce compensation cost associated with conventional options, 
and there is evidence that firms do so.  Cash-settled SARs are marked to market, 
eliminating company discretion over compensation cost and introducing 
uncertainty into the ultimate charge against earnings (even if this serves an 
earnings-smoothing function).189 
 
 Companies, apparently, prefer the stock option regime.  Only a small fraction 
of large U.S. public companies report issuing SARs.190  Presumably, this preference is 
accounting driven, as there are no other meaningful differences between the 
instruments aside from, perhaps, the relative obscurity of SARs.191 
                                                        
185 Supra text accompanying notes 34-36 
186 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 1, at 279-82. 
187 See, e.g., Murphy, supra note 1, at 279-82.  As noted supra text accompanying note 35, 
accounting rules are unlikely to have been the sole factor in the option boom.  In particular, 
it seems likely that I.R.C. section 162(m) played a role. 
188 Walker, supra note 1, at 615-17; Walker, supra note 41, at 12-14. 
189 Supra text accompanying note 130. 
190 Supra text accompanying note 54. 
191 As noted supra text accompanying note 49, there are no tax differences between 
conventional nonqualified stock options and SARs.  The relative obscurity of SARs might 
suggest path dependence, but performance share plans were relatively unfamiliar ten years 
ago and are now dominant.  Path dependence can only explain so much. 
Note also that the difference in accounting for stock options and SARs has little or nothing 
to do with disclosure.  The ex ante and realized values of options and SARs issued to senior 
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 An accounting-driven difference in the use of two economically similar 
instruments would seem to be troubling on the surface, but in fact, these two 
instruments are so economically similar that there is little or no efficiency loss if 
SARs are effectively removed from the compensation smorgasbord.192  The only 
difference between them is that options result in shares being issued, while cash-
settled SARs do not.  But the FASB has decided that conventional options can be 
effectively cash settled through the use of “cashless” exercise schemes, without 
adversely affecting the option accounting treatment, so even that difference turns 
out to be insignificant.193 
 
 But now consider the differences in accounting treatment of performance 
share plans with share-price based metrics and accounting-based metrics.  The 
former are accounted for based on a calculation of grant date fair value, just like 
options, but arguably with greater discretion to select modeling assumptions that 
minimize reported compensation expense.194  The latter are partially marked-to-
market (share price fixed; number of shares most probable to vest adjusted 
periodically and tied to actual), eliminating company discretion over compensation 
cost and adding uncertainty as to the ultimate expense booked, but providing 
significant discretion over the reported grant date value of awards made to senior 
executives.195   
 
 It is not obvious which of these regimes would be preferred from an 
accounting perspective. 196   BBCK report data suggesting a shift towards 
incorporation of accounting-based metrics.197  Different firms may have different 
                                                                                                                                                                     
executives are fully disclosed in company proxy statements.  17 C.F.R. §229.402 (2015).  
The real difference lies in the adjustment to earnings with respect to the instruments. 
192 Commentators have long recognized and criticized the significant differences in 
accounting treatment of stock options and economically equivalent cash-settled SARs.  
However, they have not recognized that the resulting distortion likely has little or no 
efficiency cost in this particular situation.  See Balsam, supra note 104, at 56 (noting “the 
incentive to design plans ‘around accounting standards’”); Maines et al., supra note 162, at 
66 (noting that focus on form over substance leads to “transaction structuring to meet 
reporting goals”); Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 12 (“ad hoc accounting rules facilitate 
the issuance of form-over-substance claims designed to achieve a desired accounting 
result”).  To be sure, each of these commentators has additional arguments for reforming 
the accounting treatment of options, which at the time constituted the primary equity 
compensation vehicle. 
193 Supra note 101. 
194 Supra text accompanying notes 166-167. 
195 Supra text accompanying notes 169-173. 
196 Note that if valuation assumptions are unbiased, the expected compensation expense 
would be the same under grant date valuation or partial mark-to-market accounting, but as 
we have seen different methods provide differing opportunities for manipulation, and 
greater or lesser uncertainty with respect to compensation cost. 
197 BBCK (2016), supra note 44, at 39-40. 
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views.  The point is that these are significant differences in accounting treatments 
that may distort compensation plan design.  Moreover, assuming one takes 
incentives at all seriously, it matters whether performance targets are based on 
share-price metrics, such as total shareholder return, or accounting-based metrics, 
such as earnings per share.  These are not interchangeable the way that options and 
SARs are interchangeable.  Incentives do matter, sometimes too much.  If you 
compensate a manager based on growth in earnings per share, she will tend to focus 
excessively on growth in earnings per share.198  Companies need to be deliberate in 
the selection of plan metrics and accounting driven distortions can interfere with 
efficient design. 
 
 To be sure, firms can adopt multiple metrics.  Firms can take advantage of the 
partial mark-to-market accounting regime, if they so choose, by adding an 
accounting-based metric to a plan that already incorporates one or more share-
price based metrics.  It need not be an either/or proposition.  But adding metrics 
primarily to achieve accounting ends is suboptimal as well.  Additional metrics may 
distract managers from their primary mission.199   
 
 Consistency in the accounting treatment for equity pay can be best achieved 
at the full mark-to-market end of the spectrum, by basing compensation cost on 
realized equity pay proceeds.200  Even then, adopting mark-to-market accounting 
would not completely level the accounting playing field.   
 
 The most economically significant equity pay instruments currently in use 
are performance shares, options, and time-vested RS/RSUs.  It is feasible (even if 
arguably unwise) to base compensation expense for each of these on a measure of 
grant date fair value, except for performance shares with non-share price based 
metrics.  As noted above, the FASB has concluded that we lack the technology 
currently to adequately value the latter at grant.201   
 
With its emphasis on grant date share price and estimating the number of 
shares that is most probable to vest, the partial mark-to-market approach that FASB 
has adopted for performance shares utilizing accounting-based metrics is only 
suitable for variable share awards.  For time-vested restricted stock, application of 
                                                        
198 PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 240 (noting 
that when an employees time allocations and effort cannot be observed, “[p]roviding strong 
incentives for a portion of an employee’s activities can cause the employee to cut back his or 
her effort in other activities”). 
199 MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 198, at 240. 
200 As noted supra notes 32-37, it appears that earnings matter to corporate decision 
makers independent of cash flows and that disclosure is not a perfect substitute for 
incorporating accounting information in earnings.  As such, consistent earnings adjustments 
are needed to level the accounting playing field for equity pay, not just consistent disclosure 
via footnotes to financial statements. 
201 Supra text accompanying note 155. 
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the partial mark-to-market approach would be trivial; it would be the same as the 
current grant date fair value approach.  For options, the partial mark-to-market 
approach simply makes no sense.  If one locks in the share price at the time of grant 
for an at-the-money option, the option would never be in the money and there 
would never be any compensation cost to record. 
 
Each of these equity instruments can be accounted for on a full mark-to-
market basis.  Although it is unusual, we already do so when options take the form 
of cash-settled SARs.  This approach could easily be applied to all options.  It could 
also easily be applied to all performance share plans. The only difference between 
full mark-to-market and partial mark-to-market, is that the share price floats as well 
as the number of shares probable to vest.  The approach can also be applied to time 
vested RS/RSUs.  Rather than booking the share price at grant, we would book the 
share price at vesting, and adjust for fluctuations between grant and vesting. 
 
Full mark-to-market or realization-based accounting is feasible for all types 
of equity pay and would level the playing field with respect to accounting for 
compensation cost firm-wide.202  To be sure, proxy statement disclosure of the grant 
date value of executive pay would be unaffected.  We would still need to use models 
or estimates for options and performance shares to generate this information.  And 
the opportunity to minimize reported executive pay would undoubtedly affect the 
choice of pay instrument at some companies.  Nonetheless, realization-based 
accounting for equity pay would eliminate the influence of accounting on 
compensation design along one important dimension, and this provides another 
rationale for embracing full mark-to-market accounting as the general rule for 
equity pay. 
 
6. Timing Differences 
 
Thus far we have focused primarily on determining the amount of 
compensation cost booked as an expense and less on the timing of the entries.  In 
the world of tax, timing is critical.203  Deferring the payment of a fixed amount of tax 
reduces the present value of the obligation.204  But financial accounting is quite 
                                                        
202 While consistent application of realization-based accounting to equity-based and other 
long-term pay would eliminate inconsistencies in accounting between these instruments, it 
would sharpen the accounting contrast between annual salary and bonus (expensed at cash 
value in the year of grant) and long-term compensation (marked to market).  As a result, 
some firms might marginally increase their emphasis on the former at the expense of the 
latter.  In my view, however, this is less of a concern than is the current inconsistency in 
accounting for various long-term compensation devices. 
203 Daniel I. Halperin, Interest in Disguise: Taxing the Time Value of Money, 95 YALE L.J. 506 
(1986). 
204 At least in the case of pure deferral, such as an option to immediately deduct an expense 
that would normally be capitalized.  Daniel I. Halperin & Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Understanding 
Income Tax Deferral, 67 TAX L. REV. 317 (2014) (distinguishing “pure deferral,” which is 
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different.  Often there are no cash flow consequences from accelerating book income 
recognition or deferring it.  But this does not mean that managers aren’t concerned 
about the timing of accounting income or deductions.  Not only do managers prefer 
to report greater income to investors rather than lesser; they prefer to report 
greater income now and lesser income later, if given the option to do so.205 
 
Nonetheless, differences in the timing of compensation cost recognition 
associated with various equity pay instruments would seem to be a second order 
concern.  With the exception of options and SARs, compensation cost would be 
recognized ratably across the vesting or performance period for all forms of equity 
pay under all methods.  For example, under current rules, the calculated ex ante 
value of performance shares incorporating only share-price based metrics is 
recognized ratably over the performance period.  If these instruments were marked 
to market, the expense would still be recognized over the performance period, 
although the amount recognized each year would vary with market movements, as 
one would expect with marking to market.  In either case, grant date valuation 
would be based on a model, providing equal latitude for minimizing the proxy 
statement reported value of any performance shares granted to senior 
executives.206   
 
Similarly, the compensation cost for performance shares incorporating 
accounting-based metrics would be recognized across the performance period 
under either the current partial mark-to-market system or a full mark-to-market 
system.  And again, the two methods provide equal discretion with respect to grant 
date valuation/reporting of senior executive compensation.207 
 
There is a difference in the timing of expense recognition for options and 
SARs depending on whether they are accounted for based on grant date fair value or 
are marked to market.  Options and SARs typically vest between one and five years 
following grant, and are expensed ratably over the same period under grant date 
fair value accounting.208  Under a mark-to-market approach, the expense for options 
or SARs continues to be adjusted post-vesting until the instruments are exercised or 
                                                                                                                                                                     
equivalent to an interest-free loan from the government, from “counterparty deferral,” the 
tax advantage of which depends on the parties’ tax rates). 
205 SCHOLES ET AL., supra note 129, at 141.   
206 This does not imply that first year expense recognition would be identical under the two 
schemes.  It would not.  Currently, the value of a performance share award with a market 
metric is measured at grant, once and for all, and is recognized ratably over the 
performance period.  Under the mark-to-market approach that currently applies to cash-
settled SARs, the expense for the first year would be determined, using a model, at the end 
of that year. 
207 Recall that grant date reporting of compensation is only relevant for the “top 5” 
executives of public companies.  See supra text accompanying note 29.  Outside this rarefied 
group, the only issue is the amount of compensation expense recognized with respect to 
equity pay. 
208 Supra text accompanying notes 43-47. 
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expire unexercised, which can be up to ten years following grant.209  On average, 
options that are in the money are exercised about five to six years following 
grant.210  In any event, under a mark-to-market approach, the period of expense 
recognition for options/SARs would be longer than it is under grant date fair value 
accounting.  However, the post-vesting adjustments to compensation cost and 
earnings may be positive or negative.  There is no reason to expect a bias.  Aside 
from a distaste for uncertainty, the extended recognition period for options under a 
full mark-to-market regime would not seem to be a major negative. 
 
C. Additional Arguments Against Realization-Based Accounting for Equity Pay 
 
 In the previous sections, I have attempted to provide a balanced view of the 
arguments in favor of realization-based accounting for equity pay, as well as the 
related counter-arguments or limitations.  However, there are several counter-
arguments that deserve separate consideration.  This section will briefly consider 
these functional arguments, setting aside “is it equity or a liability?”-type debates. 
 
1. Mark-to-Market or Realization-Based Accounting Introduces 
Unnecessary Noise into Reported Compensation Expense 
 
 One can certainly argue that to the extent that equity pay realizations reflect 
broad market movements, or perhaps even a random walk, incorporating these 
results in compensation cost introduces noise that reduces the comparability of 
results from firm to firm and over time.  This much is true, but this is really just the 
flip-side of the arguments made in Part III.B.2 above.  The question is whether 
increases or decreases in compensation post-grant should be thought of as noise or 
as useful information.  Even realized retail sales commissions reflect some market 
noise. 
 
 I argued in Part III.B.2 above that the rise of performance share plans means 
that pay is now more closely tied to performance, mitigating the noise concern, but 
some noise remains.  The relevant questions are whether including post-grant price 
movements in compensation cost increases the usefulness of the information and, 
                                                        
209 Supra text accompanying note 53.  Kaplan & Palepu argue that mark-to-market 
accounting should cease at vesting because at that point the employee “becomes just 
another equity holder.”  Kaplan & Palepu, supra note 117.  But vested employee stock 
options remain nontransferable and are not equivalent to market traded options.  As a 
result, valuation at vesting would still be based on a model and would require assumptions 
on early exercise dates, raising manipulation concerns.  Moreover, absent a change in tax 
rules, book/tax conformity is not achieved unless marking to market continues to exercise.  
On balance, it seems sensible to continue to mark options and SARs to market until the 
instruments are exercised or expire.  
210 Supra note 139. 
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even if it does not, whether some additional noise is an acceptable price to pay for 
the other benefits of realization-based accounting – limiting manipulation of 
compensation cost, minimizing accounting-based distortions in pay design, and 
achieving book/tax conformity. 
 
2. Realization-Based Accounting Creates an Unacceptable Level of 
Uncertainty in Compensation Cost 
 
 With grant date-based accounting, compensation cost arising from a stock 
option is fixed and certain at the time of grant.  With realization-based accounting, 
the ultimate expense is uncertain.  Mark-to-market compensation cost for an option 
could rise sharply in a bull market.  This uncertainty could be viewed as a drawback 
to realization-based accounting for compensation cost.211  Compensation expense 
uncertainty is the flip-side of the earnings-smoothing benefit of mark-to-market 
discussed in Part III.B.2 above, but the concern would be that the cost of uncertainty 
may outweigh the earnings-smoothing benefit. 
 
 We should first observe that the uncertainty here is a real economic 
phenomenon.  If the accounting is uncertain, it is only because the underlying 
obligation is uncertain.  A firm that issues a stock option is committed to deliver 
shares to the employee at exercise.  The employee pays a fixed, pre-determined 
price for the shares.  The shares delivered may be worth several multiples of the 
exercise price or the option may expire unexercised and worthless.  The opportunity 
cost at exercise is highly uncertain at grant. 
 
 Of course, firms can do something about the underlying economic 
uncertainty and the resulting accounting uncertainty under a realization-based 
approach.  The payoff on an option or an SAR can be capped.212  The time frame for 
exercise or payout can be constricted, reducing, but not eliminating, uncertainty in 
both actual and reported compensation cost.213  It may also be possible for firms to 
                                                        
211 Commentators frequently note the unattractiveness of mark-to-market or “variable 
accounting,” as this approach was labeled under APB 25.  However, it generally is not clear 
whether the primary concern with mark-to-market accounting is uncertainty, volatility 
(discussed in the following subsection), or simply the administrative cost of periodic 
calculation of the equity compensation valuations.  See, e.g., Mark E. Bokert, Understanding 
the New Accounting Rules for Stock Options and Other Awards, 13(7) THE METROPOLITAN 
CORPORATE COUNSEL (July 2005), available at 
http://www.dglaw.com/images_user/newsalerts/MCCJuly05Bokert.pdf (noting that “SARs 
are subject to variable accounting.  For this reason, not many companies use SARs.”). 
212 Urban Outfitters, for example, has issued SARs to executives with payouts capped at 
500% of the grant date fair value of the awards.  See URBAN OUTFITTERS, INC., 2011 PROXY 
STATEMENT (FORM DEF 14A) 32, (Apr. 1, 2011). 
213 The shift in emphasis away from options and in favor of performance shares has already 
had this effect.  Stock options typically expire ten years following grant.  While in-the-money 
options generally are exercised well prior to expiration, the potential exists for 10 years of 
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hedge equity pay arrangements by purchasing shares of their own stock on the 
market that they can then deliver to their employees (or sell back into the market) 
when an equity pay award is exercised or settled.214   
 
3. Realization-Based Accounting Creates an Unacceptable Level of 
Volatility in Compensation Cost 
 
 A related concern is that realization-based accounting introduces an 
unacceptable level of volatility into compensation cost reporting, and, if significant 
enough, earnings.215  This may be a valid concern, but as several commentators have 
proposed, the concern can be addressed by smoothing the adjustment of earnings 
for compensation cost.216  Note that this smoothing is not equivalent to grant date-
based accounting.  Ultimately, realized compensation cost would be fully reflected in 
earnings under a smoothed mark-to-market approach. 
 
To isolate the volatility issue, suppose a firm makes an option or SAR grant to 
an executive that vests in three years and expires in ten years.  Suppose the grant 
date BSM value is $3 million.  If the instrument is an option, the current accounting 
treatment would require the firm to ratably expense the grant date value over the 
three year life resulting in an expense of $1 million per year for three years.   
 
Suppose instead that the instrument is an SAR and that at the end of the first 
year the BSM value of the instrument is $4.5 million (due to an increase in stock 
price, volatility, and/or projected dividend yield over that first year).  The first year 
expense would be 1/3 of this amount or $1.5 million.  Assume at the end of year two 
that the recalculated BSM value is $6 million.  Because service has been provided for 
two years, the cumulative expense that must be recognized is $4 million.  Thus, the 
second year expense would be $2.5 million ($4 million minus $1.5 million).  Now 
suppose the market heads south and the BSM value at the end of year three falls 
back to $3 million.  The option has now vested and cumulative expense must equal 
$3 million, requiring a negative adjustment to compensation cost in year three of $1 
million.   
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
appreciation.  Performance share plans are typically based on a three-year performance 
period, reducing the scope for massive escalation in share value between grant and payout. 
214 Hedging can certainly be used to minimize the underlying economic uncertainty of 
equity grants.  An adjustment in accounting for hedging transactions may be needed to 
enable firms to hedge the uncertainty in compensation cost for net income that is associated 
with mark-to-market accounting.  Hedge accounting is briefly discussed in Part IV below. 
215 See, e.g., G. Edgar Adkins, FAS 123(R) – Avoiding the Unexpected, at 6, GRANT THORNTON, 
available at http://www.grantthornton.com/~/media/content-page-files/tax/pdfs/white-
papers-survey-reports-articles/2013/FAS-123R-avoiding-the-unexpected.ashx (noting that 
liability awards may result in income statement volatility). 
216 Infra text accompanying note 220. 
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In both cases, aggregate compensation cost recognized over the three years 
is $3 million, but the option results in ratable recognition, while the SAR results in 
volatile stream of compensation cost of $1.5 million, $2.5 million, and -$1 million.  I 
have, to be sure, concocted an example in which option treatment gets to the “right” 
result and produces much less volatility in compensation cost recognition,217 but the 
volatility issue is a real concern even if one has a clear preference for realization-
based accounting over grant date fair value-based accounting. 
 
While some proponents of realization-based accounting for equity pay 
support adjusting compensation cost and net income in each period for changes in 
valuation occurring during that period218 – the current SAR approach – others 
suggest smoothing the incorporation of compensation cost adjustments into net 
income.  As Professors Kirschenheiter, Mathur, and Thomas (KMT) note, mark-to-
market accounting should, in principle, reduce earnings volatility – the earnings-
smoothing function – but it can increase volatility when compensation cost 
adjustments are concentrated in a single year while broader earnings impacts are 
spread over several years.219  Given that possibility, KMT suggest that annual 
changes in option values be “’smoothed’ over future years’ earnings;” recorded as 
“other comprehensive income” (OCI), an account used to record certain gains and 
losses that do not directly impact the key net income or earnings figure;220 or 
disclosed in footnotes.221  Professors Ohlson and Penman go a step further, explicitly 
proposing that the mark-to-market adjustments be initially recorded as OCI, but 
“gradually pass through the Income Statement,” such that these gains and losses 
“would thereby be ‘smoothed’ over many periods into Net Income.”222  Ohlson and 
Penman find this ultimate truing up to be an “attractive feature” of this approach as 
it both recognizes the true economic cost of equity pay to shareholders and 
minimizes the incentives to under-report executive pay.223 
                                                        
217 Obviously here I am designating the mark-to-market/realization-based approach as the 
“right” result.  Note, however, that while option and SAR accounting have converged at the 
end of year three in this example, there is no guarantee that the final compensation cost will 
converge.  Option accounting ends with vesting.  SAR mark-to-market accounting continues 
until exercise or expiration. 
218 Maines et al., supra note 162, at 74. 
219 Kirschenheiter et al., supra note 104, at 154. 
220 J. DAVID SPICELAND ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 194 (6th ed. 2011).  Gains or losses 
from foreign currency translation are an example of an income item that bypasses net 
income but is included in OCI.  Id. 
221 Kirschenheiter et al., supra note 104, at 155.  Kirschenheiter, Mathur, and Thomas do not 
take a position on which of these approaches to reporting mark-to-market compensation 
cost adjustments would be superior. 
222 Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 24.  Ohlson and Penman prefer to initially separate 
what they term “windfall gains and losses” arising from mark-to-market accounting for 
equity pay from net income by running these gains and losses through OCI because, in their 
view, analysts will wish to separate these adjustments from “’core’ or ‘recurring’ Net 
Income.”  Id. at 18. 
223 Ohlson & Penman, supra note 99, at 21, 22. 
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To be clear, the Ohlson and Penman approach simply smoothes the 
incorporation of mark-to-market adjustments for equity pay into net income, 
addressing the volatility concern, but maintaining the ultimate link between 
aggregate compensation cost recognition and employee realizations from equity 
pay.  While the current accounting for stock options also results in a smooth 
adjustment to earnings, the similarities between the two approaches ends there. 
 
Also, to be clear, the current liability-based accounting for SARs and for cash-
settled performance awards does not smooth mark-to-market adjustments into net 
income.  In each period, net income is adjusted for changes in equity pay valuation 
that arise in that period.  At the end of the day, while I believe the case for reflecting 
equity pay realizations in net income is strong, I am agnostic whether mark-to-
market adjustments should be recognized as they arise or smoothed into net 
income.224   
 
* * * * * 
 
 To be sure, each of the foregoing concerns – the introduction of unnecessary 
noise, uncertainty, and volatility into earnings – could be alleviated by mandating 
footnoting of marked-to-market compensation cost rather than requiring firms to 
incorporate mark-to-market adjustments into their earnings calculations with 
respect to long-term pay awards classified as equity.  While the adoption of a 
footnoting approach might be viewed as a partial victory, it would likely be a hollow 
victory from a corporate governance perspective.  The U.S. stock option expensing 
saga demonstrates that firms are much less responsive to footnoting than they are 
to expensing.225  Moreover, as I have argued above,226 mark-to-market accounting 
for equity pay is increasingly appropriate given the evolution of these instruments. 
IV. A Note on Hedging Equity Compensation Awards 
 
 
 At the time of grant, the ultimate payout on equity compensation awards is 
uncertain.  That uncertainty is inherent in a scheme that ties pay to long-term 
performance, which is unknown at grant.  Payouts are uncertain in two respects.  
First, there is underlying economic uncertainty: What will it cost the firm to deliver 
the shares or share-based cash at exercise or settlement?  Second, there may be 
                                                        
224 An additional argument for smoothing mark-to-market adjustments into net income is 
that the volatility issue would be more significant in industries characterized by more 
volatile stock prices and that, without smoothing, adoption of mark-to-market accounting 
could be viewed as penalizing companies in those industries. 
225 Supra text accompanying notes 186-187. 
226 Supra Part III(B). 
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uncertainty regarding the amount of compensation cost ultimately recorded for the 
pay award: How much will the award reduce earnings? 
 
 The evidence is mixed on the degree to which firms hedge equity pay awards.  
Many firms repurchase shares on a regular basis to manage the dilution that results 
from regularly issuing shares or options to employees.  Whether intended or not, 
those repurchases may serve to hedge the economic impact of equity awards.227 
 
 Suppose a firm explicitly hedges an equity pay award.  Suppose the firm 
issues an RSU on a single share that vests in three years and at the same time 
repurchases a share on the market.  The firm has locked in the economic cost of the 
compensation since the firm can deliver the purchased share to the employee at 
vesting.  This hedge does not impact the incentives of the employee, so the incentive 
function is maintained without exposing the firm to the risk of a share price run up 
during the vesting period. 
 
 This hedge is effective as an economic matter, but what about as a means of 
managing uncertainty in reported compensation cost and net income?  Under 
current accounting rules for equity pay, there is no compensation cost uncertainty.  
The compensation cost for an RSU is not currently marked to market.  
Compensation cost is set equal to the grant date value of the share and is recovered 
over the vesting period.228  Moreover, the hedge has no impact on net income 
because gains or losses on transactions by a company in its own shares do not flow 
through the income statement.  They are considered transactions between a firm 
and its owners.229  In sum, when a firm hedges equity awards subject to grant date 
fair value accounting in order to eliminate economic uncertainty, accounting for the 
                                                        
227 A number of studies find a relationship between option grants and share repurchases, 
although the rationales are less certain.  See Gene Amromin & Nellie Liang, Hedging 
Employee Stock Options, Corporate Taxes, and Debt, 66 NAT. TAX J. 513 (2003) (finding 
evidence consistent with stock option hedging); Daniel A. Bens et al., Employee Stock 
Options, EPS Dilution, and Stock Repurchases, 36 J. ACCT. & ECON. 51, 82, 86 (2003) 
(concluding that financial reporting considerations, specifically the dilutive effect of options 
on EPS, explain repurchase decisions); Kathleen M. Kahle, When a Buyback Isn’t a Buyback: 
Open Market Repurchases and Employee Options, 63 J. FIN. ECON. 235 (2002) (earnings 
dilution); Haim A. Mozes & Steven B. Raymar, Granting and Hedging Employee Stock Options: 
A Tax Motivation and Empirical Tests 1 (Working Paper July 24, 2001) (finding evidence 
consistent with a tax motivation for option related repurchases); Scott J. Weisbenner, 
Corporate Share Repurchases in the 1990s: What Role Do Stock Options Play? 25 (FEDS 
Working Paper No. 2000-29, Apr. 2000) (finding evidence consistent with dilution 
management and executive self-enrichment theories); Daniel A. Rogers, Repurchases, 
Employee Stock Option Grants, and Hedging 7-15, 17 (Working Paper, Sept. 2006) (finding 
for a sample of 151 large firms over the decade ending in 2004, median share repurchase 
equal to 36% of shares underlying options issued in a given year (0% at 25th percentile; 
158% at 75th percentile) and finding evidence consistent with a hedging motivation). 
228 Supra text accompanying notes 59-61. 
229 SPICELAND ET AL., supra note 220, at 1024. 
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hedge does not undo the compensation cost certainty that is a hallmark of this 
approach to accounting for equity compensation. 
 
 Now suppose that all equity awards were subject to mark-to-market 
accounting.  Firms issuing these instruments would face both economic and 
compensation cost/net income uncertainty.  Hedging these awards as described 
above could eliminate the economic uncertainty, but if the hedge is accounted for as 
just described, the gains and losses on the hedge would not flow through the income 
statement and would not offset the losses and gains on the equity award that arise 
from mark-to-market accounting.  Under the existing rules, a firm could not hedge 
the net income impact of equity awards that are marked to market by repurchasing 
its own shares.230  This would be a perverse result.  If realization-based accounting 
were to be adopted as the general approach to equity pay accounting, it would be 
sensible to permit gains and losses on share repurchases specifically identified as 
hedging marked-to-market equity awards to flow through the income statement so 





 The U.S. equity compensation landscape continues to evolve.  Recent 
innovations have improved the linkage between pay and firm-specific performance, 
but have added complexity.  Given these changes, and whether considering the 
matter within the FASB’s conceptual framework or as a matter of facilitating good 
corporate governance, the arguments for adopting realization-based accounting for 
equity compensation have never been stronger.  To me they are persuasive.  But 
rather than recapping the arguments (see the abstract, introduction, or text), let me 
conclude this Article with a word about accounting for equity pay and politics. 
 
 While accounting is not as overtly political as tax, for instance, there is little 
doubt that political considerations play a role in the standard setting process.  The 
FASB does not adopt standards in a vacuum.  And politics have played a particularly 
visible role in the battles over accounting for equity pay.  Numerous bills have been 
introduced in Congress that would have directed the FASB or SEC to regulate, or 
refrain from regulating, in this arena.231  Although none of these bills passed, the 
                                                        
230 The inability to hedge the income statement impact of SARs might be another reason for 
the relative unpopularity of these instruments compared with conventional options. 
231 A non-exhaustive list includes the following: the Corporate Executives’ Stock Option 
Accountability Act, introduced by Senator Levin in 1993, which would have directed the SEC 
to require firms to expense options; the Equity Expansion Act of 1993, introduced by 
Senator Lieberman, which would have prohibited the SEC from mandating option 
expensing; the Broad-Based Stock Option Plan Transparency Act, introduced in the House in 
2005 and which would have directed the SEC to adopt enhanced disclosure for option 
compensation, to examine and report to Congress on the effectiveness of those disclosures, 
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simple introduction of such legislation must attract the attention of the regulators.  
The last thing the FASB or the profession needs is for Congress to meddle in 
accounting standards.  But political considerations extend beyond Congress.  
Accounting is largely a self-regulated profession, and it must be difficult for the 
regulators to ignore a near consensus among those regulated.  It was highly 
commendable of the FASB to mandate option expensing in the face of overwhelming 
industry opposition. 
 
 I do not purport to know what the members of the FASB were thinking in 
2004 when they adopted stock option expensing based on grant-date valuation.  But 
a move from a regime under which option compensation resulted in booking no 
expense at all to one requiring mark-to-market accounting, raising concerns about 
volatile and unpredictable earnings, might well have been unattainable.  Even if 
some FASB members thought a realization-based approach to be superior, it might 
have been perfectly sensible in 2004 to support an achievable grant-date 
measurement approach.  
 
 But a decade has passed.  Few would argue today that stock options or any 
other form of equity pay should not be expensed at all.   Thus, while it’s certain that 
a shift to realization-based accounting for equity pay would not be popular with 
industry, there’s little or no risk of a backlash returning us to a pre-SFAS 123R world 
of “free” options.  Moreover, it seems unlikely that a proposal to shift from grant-
date to realization-based measurement would attract congressional attention the 
way the fundamental expensing question did.  More likely, most members of 
Congress and their staffs would view such a change as a tweak. 
 
 If so, perhaps the regulatory “space” exists for the FASB to readdress the 
details of equity pay expensing and, in particular, the grant-date measurement 
requirement.  Perhaps it is best to do so in the context of reassessing the 
equity/liability characterization of equity pay awards, but, as I have argued, one 
would hope that functional considerations will ultimately determine the outcome, 
not formal characterization as an equity instrument or a liability.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                     
to refrain from issuing new option accounting rules in the interim; the Ending Excessive 
Corporate Deductions for Stock Options Act, introduced by Senator Levin and others in 
2009 and other years, which would have, inter alia, limited corporate tax deductions for 
options to the amount recognized as an expense for financial accounting purposes. 
